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— Note —

We Can’t Breathe:
Reimagining Equal Protection
as a Collective Right
George Floyd couldn’t breathe.
We can’t either.
We live in fear.
Fear of walking outside. Wearing a hoodie. Going for a jog. Sleeping
in our own home. Existing.
Every day, a new hashtag. Every hour, a new injustice. Every
second, more pain.
We don’t deserve to live like this—and we continue to fight until
white supremacy no longer permeates every corner of this country—
until we can live full lives—freely.
- Black Lives Matter, “Rest in Power, Beautiful”1
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Introduction
From Eric Garner2 to Breonna Taylor3 to George Floyd4 to Tamir
Rice5 and Sandra Bland,6 the seemingly endless deaths of Black
individuals in the United States at the hands of the police recentered
2.

See Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold
Raises Old Issue for the Police, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2014, at A1
(explaining how Eric Garner’s death following officer’s use of a banned,
dangerous chokehold resulted in renewed conversations about the use of
the banned practice in recent excessive force complaints).

3.

See Dylan Lovan, Impatience Grows for Cops’ Arrests in Breonna Taylor’s
Death, Associated Press (June 25, 2020, 5:39 AM), https://apnews.com/
article/us-news-ap-top-news-arrests-racial-injustice-shootings-bb0b2c8e4e
10b35421fd70f5fc5fb9c6 [https://perma.cc/K69B-JDV9] (“[T]hree months
after plainclothes detectives serving a warrant busted into [Breonna Taylor’s]
Louisville, Kentucky apartment and shot the 26-year-old Black woman to
death, only one of the three officers who opened fire has lost his job. . . .
Calls for action against the officers have gotten louder during a national
reckoning over racism and police brutality . . . .”).

4.

See Kadijatou Diallo & John Shattuck, Opinion, George Floyd and the
History of Police Brutality in America, Bos. Globe (June 1, 2020, 5:06 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/01/opinion/george-floyd-historypolice-brutality-america/ [https://perma.cc/X758-955U] (“By recognizing
the long history of racism in the justice system, Americans can grasp why
deaths like George Floyd’s are symptomatic of a larger failure of American
justice.”).

5.

See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., National Questions Over Police Hit Home in
Cleveland, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/
09/us/family-of-boy-killed-by-cleveland-officer-to-pursue-criminal-case.html
[https://perma.cc/8KQM-EEKC] (explaining how details of twelve-year-old
Tamir Rice’s death by police have “become part of a broader narrative about
police violence in African-American communities around the country”).

6.

See David Montgomery, Sandra Bland, It Turns Out, Filmed Traffic Stop
Confrontation Herself, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2019, 7:58 AM), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/us/sandra-bland-video-brian-encinia.html?
searchResultPosition=34 [https://perma.cc/WCG3-CBWH] (“[Sandra]
Bland, a 28-year-old African-American from the Chicago area, was taken
into custody in southeast Texas following [a] confrontational 2015 traffic
stop and was found hanging in a jail cell three days later in what was
officially ruled a suicide. . . . . The case, which drew international attention,
intensified outrage over the treatment of black people by white police
officers and was considered a turning point in the Black Lives Matter
movement.”).
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debates over the causes of police brutality in legal and popular
commentary. Traditionally, police excessive force has been described in
individualistic terms, as a problem of “bad apples” or rogue police
officers who go beyond department regulation because of overt or
implicit animosity towards Black people.7 More recently, however, this
narrative has been challenged by arguments that emphasize the
structural dimensions of police brutality. Sociologists and socio-legal
scholars in particular have highlighted the myriad ways in which
structural forces such as gentrification, housing policies, environmental
policies, and policing practices converge to increase Black Americans’
exposure to police and risk of death at their hands.8 Legal scholars
further point to the nation’s constitutional terrain as a structural
dimension of excessive force, with a legal structure represented in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that both enables and perpetuates
state violence against communities of color by insulating officers via a
“highly deferential” reasonableness standard and denying group-based
remedies to its victims.9
At the heart of current debates over the causes of police excessive
force are differing conceptions of the nature of police brutality, its
causes, and its consequences. Is police brutality caused by intentional
acts of prejudice of independent officers against communities of color?
Or is such state violence the result of implicit biases or social forces?
Further, what precisely is the harm that results when officer after officer
kills a Black person? Is police brutality a harm confined to the individual victim, or is it a form of structural oppression, a harm experienced
at and against the level of the collectivity? At a practical level, answers
to these questions undoubtedly inform the legal vehicles by which
victims of police brutality can secure justice and the types of remedies
deemed necessary to redress the harm inflicted by state violence.
This Note critically analyzes the ways in which police brutality—
as a rights violation—is currently framed by the Supreme Court and
the implications of such rights framing for the pursuit of racial justice

7.

Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment:
Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical
Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1465, 1468 (2018).

8.

See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev.
545, 549–62 (2017); Rory Kramer, Brianna Remster & Camille Z. Charles,
Black Lives and Police Tactics Matter, Contexts, Oct. 5, 2017, at 20,
24 (2017); Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1468; Devon W.
Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1493–95 (2016) [hereinafter Carbado, Blueon-Black Violence].

9.

See Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1480–1481 (quoting and
discussing John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive
Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 155,
155–56 (2016)).
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in the United States. Since Graham v. Connor,10 the Supreme Court
has largely framed police brutality through a Fourth Amendment
individual rights frame, holding excessive force as a violation by a singular officer of a person’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizure.11 Increasingly dissatisfied with the Graham doctrine’s inability
to recognize and redress the structural dimensions of police brutality,
scholars have called for a re-examination of the potential of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an alternative
mechanism by which the courts can take the structural dynamics of
excessive force into account.12 Such calls, however, neglect the fact that
police brutality under the Equal Protection Clause is similarly framed
as a violation of an individual’s right to equality before the law. That
is, the Supreme Court has adopted individual rights framing of the right
to equal protection of the law, solidified by the intentional-discrimination requirement of Washington v. Davis,13 that constructs police
brutality as an isolated harm caused by purposeful acts by individual
officers motivated by racial prejudice.
Ultimately, this Note argues that reconstructing police brutality
under an equal-protection frame will fail to acknowledge and redress
the structural causes and consequences of police excessive force until
both equal protection and police brutality are reframed in collective
terms. In other words, only when the nature of police brutality against
individuals in the Black community is understood as a violation of the
Black community’s collective right to equal protection, caused by structural practices and resulting in collective harms, can the Fourteenth
Amendment offer Black people any kind of legal vehicle for the pursuit
of racial justice in the context of state-sponsored violence.
Importantly, as many scholars aptly note, the potential of the
Fourteenth Amendment in responding to police excessive force against
communities of color is constrained by the current hold the Graham
and Washington v. Davis doctrines have on Supreme Court jurisprudence.14 While recognizing the apparent impracticality of equalprotection claims prevailing in court when such claims are framed as a
collective right, particularly in light of the individualist, liberal-legalist
cultural context in which Supreme Court reasoning is embedded, this
Note asserts that reframing police brutality as a violation of the Black
community’s collective right to equality is not a futile endeavor.
Adopting a performative perspective to rights framing, this Note argues
that by declaring that Black people, as a community, have a right to
equality, plaintiffs engage in a fundamentally political activity whose
10.

490 U.S. 386 (1989).

11.

See id. at 396–99; Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1485.

12.

Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1498.

13.

426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).

14.

See, e.g., Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1469–70, 1469 n.11.
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instrumental value extends beyond the realm of the courts. Rather,
such rights claiming is, at its core, a political practice with constitutive
and transformative effects on conceptions of issues related to identity,
citizenship, and state-citizen relations. Thus, this Note examines not
only the practical impact of framing police brutality in individual versus
collective rights terms, but also the performative potential of such
rights frames.
Part I of this Note briefly describes the performative approach to
rights framing, which is then adopted in the subsequent analysis. A
performative approach shifts focus from whether a particular rights
claim reflects legal or moral reality to what is done in and by making a
rights claim.
Part II examines the content of the dominant frame in current
excessive-force jurisprudence—the Fourth Amendment individual
rights frame solidified by the Court in Graham, which construed
§ 198315 excessive-force claims as a violation of an individual’s right to
be free from unreasonable seizure. This Part’s performative-frame
analysis of the Graham doctrine and subsequent jurisprudence reveals
the ways in which the causes and consequences of excessive force are
framed in individualistic, ahistorical, and decontextualized terms that
distort the lived reality of police brutality. The Court’s reliance on the
Fourth Amendment individual rights frame reinforces an atomized,
colorblind conception of police brutality, its perpetrators, and victims.
Part III responds to scholarly calls to re-examine the potential of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, concluding that
the Supreme Court treats equal-protection claims in similarly individualistic and decontextualized terms.
Part IV recommends that the legal community adopt an understanding of police brutality and the right to equal protection that is
grounded in collective terms. This results in a reframing of the
individual rights to be free from unreasonable seizure and equal
protection of the law as the collective right to be free from gratuitous,
racialized state violence. In doing so, this Part reconceptualizes the
organizing beliefs of the equal protection frame in terms of structural
racism, eschewing the individualistic focus of traditional racism that
drives contemporary Fourth Amendment and equal-protection rights
frames. Rather than locating the impetus for police excessive force in
individual overt racial animus or implicit racial bias, a collective rights
frame holds as the catalyst for excessive force a confluence of racially
motivated structural practices that disproportionately expose communities of color to police use of force. While a discussion of the array of
structural forces that contribute to the heavy burden of state violence
experienced by the Black community is beyond the scope of this Note,
this Part highlights the causal role of policing practices in driving
contemporary police brutality. This Part also reconstructs the resultant
15.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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harm of police brutality under a collective rights frame, drawing on
interdisciplinary research to demonstrate the collective dimensions of
such state violence within the Black community. The performative
implications of such a collective rights framing are then considered in
light of the concept of dissident citizenship.
In the Conclusion, the practical ramifications of framing police
brutality through a collective rights frame are then examined. This Part
offers several remarks, including reassessing the instrumental and performative value of a collective rights framing of equal protection claims
in light of the existing constitutional terrain. Critical to the collective
framing of the right to be free from state-sponsored racial police violence
is a reimagination of the remedies necessary to redress the harm experienced by the Black community at the hands of the police. Whereas
under an individual rights framing of police brutality, plaintiffs are
precluded from pursuing injunctive relief, limiting § 1983 relief to
individual compensation,16 a collective rights framing provides temporary avenues by which plaintiffs can plead around the enormous burden
placed by the courts on those pursuing equitable relief.

I. Performative Frame Analysis
Interdisciplinary in nature, frame analysis has been embraced by
scholars in a wide range of fields including behavioral economics, social
psychology, anthropology, political science, sociology, and organizational management.17 A shared starting point for this line of research is
the understanding that “rhetorical frames matter.”18 That is, how a
given phenomenon is understood is derived, in part, from how that
phenomenon is framed.
The notion that the way the courts frame police brutality matters
is not surprising when one adopts a constitutive approach to the law.
This perspective is driven by the belief that the “law shapes society
from the inside out” by providing individuals a set of categories and
16.

See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112–13 (1982).

17.

See generally Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes
and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 Ann. Rev.
Socio. 611 (2000); W.E. Douglas Creed, Jeffrey A. Langstraat & Maureen
A. Scully, A Picture of the Frame: Frame Analysis as Technique and as
Politics, 5 Org. Rsch. Methods 34 (2002); Michael Lee Wood, Dustin
S. Stoltz, Justin Van Ness & Marshall A. Taylor, Schemas and Frames,
36 Socio. Theory 244 (2018); David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr.,
Steven K. Worden & Robert D. Benford, Frame Alignment Processes,
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 Am. Socio. Rev. 464
(1986); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449, 1458–67 (2003).

18.

Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence, supra note 8, at 1480 n.2; see also
George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal About the Mind 116 (1987); Benford & Snow,
supra note 17, at 614.
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frameworks through which the world can be interpreted.19 As Austin
Sarat and Thomas Kearns note, “[m]eaning is perhaps the key word in
the vocabulary of those who speak about law in constitutive terms.”20
The law, according to constitutivists, acts as a reservoir of meaning, a
cognitive lens through which perceptions, experiences, and actions of
the everyday can be understood.21 Notions of legality have permeated a
range of settings outside of legal institutions, with the law serving as
the basis for constructing and understanding social relationships and
social boundaries in a diversity of contexts ranging from the workplace
and schools to the home.22 As such, the law is responsible for not only
modifying social conduct, but for shaping the very identities people
assume and the relationships they hold with others.23
As an emergent structure of social life, the law does not exist
separate from social practices and identities but is intertwined with
them.24 As individuals find meaning in legal symbols and use such
meaning as the basis for social action, such meanings hold the potential
to become patterned, objectified, and institutionalized within material
and discursive structures of a given society.25 It is the institutionalization of legal categories, symbols, and terms that enables as well as
constrains processes of meaning-making in the future, with the law
setting the terms by which future experiences can be legitimately
understood.26 Within the context of police brutality, it is precisely the
courts’ discursive institutionalization of legal concepts surrounding
“‘race,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘criminality’ that play into how a situation like
the death of a young black man ‘makes sense.’”27
It is important to note here that, because of the socially constructed
nature of law, the rules, categories, and codes that constitute it are far
from objective. While many in the Western legal tradition think of the
law as a body of rules that can be mechanically applied to a given case,
the law is more akin to an ideology or discourse, existing as a set of

19.

Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of
Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in Law in Everyday Life 21, 22
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).

20.

Id. at 30.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 50–61.

23.

Id. at 60.

24.

Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law
39–40 (1998).

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Zach Newman, Note, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force,
and Equal Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 117, 128 (2015).
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contested categories and symbols that may be interpreted and manipulated in a number of ways. As Sally Engle Merry notes, “[t]he discourse
of law is neither internally consistent nor unambiguous.”28 For interpretivist scholars, it is precisely these “ambiguities, inconsistencies, and
contradictions [that] provide multiple opportunities for interpretation
and contest.”29 To fully understand the influence of law on society, the
diverse ways in which the courts frame the law must be considered.
A. Frame Analysis

Most scholars trace the origins of frame analysis to the 1974 work
of sociologist Erving Goffman, who, advancing a social-psychological
perspective, explored the processes by which individuals rely on
expectations to make sense of routine experiences, such as daily interactions, advertising, and other aspects of social life.30 According to
Goffman, frames exist as mental scripts that enable individuals to
“locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of
concrete occurrences defined in its terms.”31 As individuals enact conventionalized social behavior during the course of routine settings such
as shopping or dating, they rely on certain frames as cognitive shortcuts
to make sense of the circumstances encountered. Frames, thus, exist to
order and ascribe meaning to daily interactions, cultural norms, discourses, and other aspects of social life.32
The values and beliefs within a given frame function to reflexively
determine which aspects of reality are considered relevant to an issue
at hand.33 The metaphor of a window or picture frame is frequently
invoked to describe the selective function of a frame’s organizing
principles.34 Framing is akin to looking out a window, as both are activities by which boundaries are defined, aspects of reality are selected, and
one’s understanding of the world is structured.35 Just as looking through
a framed window restricts one’s gaze to a certain perspective while
excluding others, framing is a process that selectively identifies relevant
facts that both constitute and sustain a particular reality.36
Since Goffman’s cognitive research on framing, sociologists and
socio-legal scholars have subsequently explored the notion of “collective
28.

Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal
Consciousness Among Working-Class Americans 9 (1990).

29.

Id.

30.

See generally Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (1974).

31.

Id. at 21.

32.

Id.

33.

Creed, Langstraat & Scully, supra note 17, at 36.

34.

See id. at 36–37.

35.

Id. at 36.

36.

Id.
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action frames,” packages of meaning that exist at the level of the collectivity and work to focus attention, synthesize events, experiences, and
information, and assist in the interpretation of social life.37 In the United
States and many other liberal Western democracies, rights frames serve
as a prominent type of collective action frame deployed by socialmovement organizations seeking to advance their causes.38
1. Rights Framing

Rights discourse is central to the collective framing behavior of
social-movement organizations.39 Indeed, rights talk serves as the
foundation for legal frames that are often deployed by social-movement
organizations to transform problems into social grievances, mobilize
constituents, and provoke change.40 The cultural status of the law as a
master frame and the ubiquity of rights discourse and framing across
social movements by no means suggests that the content of deployed
legal frames are the same. Rather, social-movement actors have deployed, alternatively, two types of rights frames—collective and individual rights frames—that vary, first and foremost, with respect to their
organizing beliefs (i.e., diagnostic and prognostic beliefs).41
A frame’s diagnostic beliefs address questions such as: What is the
nature of the problem, event, or issue?42 And how is it defined and
experienced?43 Beliefs in this category include judgments about the
seriousness, nature and causes of a problem, issue, or event; “stereotypic
beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence;” and beliefs about the
victimized group.44 Diagnostic beliefs inform how actors are defined
(i.e., protagonists, antagonists, and spectators) and the extent of their
centrality to the issue at hand.45 Under one frame, actors may be
deemed essential to the resolution of a problem, while under another,
the same actors may be characterized as peripheral to or even the cause
37.

See Benford & Snow, supra note 17, at 613–14.

38.

For an overview of rights framing, see Gwendolyn Leachman, Legal
Framing, in 61 Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 25, 33–37
(Austin Sarat ed., 2013).

39.

Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing
Processes and Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s,
111 Am. J. Socio. 1718, 1726 (2006).

40.

Id. at 1751.

41.

For an in-depth discussion of the difference between individual and collective
rights frames, see Leachman, supra note 38, at 33–37.

42.

See Snow et al., supra note 17, at 470.

43.

See id.

44.

Id.; see William A. Gamson, Talking Politics 111 (1992).

45.

James K. Hertog & Douglas M. McLeod, A Multiperspectival Approach
to Framing Analysis: A Field Guide, in Framing Public Life 141, 148,
157 (Stephen D. Reese et al. eds., 2001).
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of a problem.46 Causal attributions—beliefs about the cause of a
problem, protagonists, and antagonists—are often subject to more
rigorous debate than beliefs about the nature of the problem itself, with
negotiated contestation often occurring despite agreement as to the
precise nature of the harm caused.47
Actors relying on legal rights frames may construct grievances as
violations of individual or collective rights. Whereas collective rights
frames define social grievances as group harms that violate the statusbased rights of a collectivity, individual rights framing emphasizes the
individual as the entity in need of individuated legal redress, with grievances framed as violations of personal—rather than group—rights.48
The diagnostic beliefs of an individual or collective rights frame can
have considerable impact on frame amplification, a discursive process
of accenting and highlighting issues, experiences, events, or beliefs within a frame, punctuating certain aspects while excluding others.49
With diagnostic beliefs positioning the harm experienced as collective in nature, collective rights frames emphasize the social differences
and distinct experiences of a movement’s constituency to legitimize
demands for status-based legal protections.50 As such, collective rights
frames turn the focus of a movement inward, with collective rights discourses, combined with messages of solidarity, working to reinforce a
sense of “collective identity among movement participants, which in
turn motivates collective action.”51 In contrast, individual rights frames
often strategically downplay the differences between the movement’s
constituency and other groups, preferring instead to amplify the ways
in which victimized individuals are similar to the rest of society, and
thus, deserving of equal—not special—protection under the law.52
Whereas diagnostic beliefs define a given problem as such, prognostic beliefs articulate a proposed solution to the problem, outlining a
general plan of attack and the strategies necessary to ensure change.53
Prognostic beliefs answer the question “What is to be done?”54
Prognostic beliefs are intrinsically connected to diagnostic beliefs: the
manner in which a problem is identified and characterized shapes the

46.

See id. at 157–58.

47.

Benford & Snow, supra note 17, at 616.

48.

Leachman, supra note 38, at 33–35.

49.

Benford & Snow, supra note 17, at 623.

50.

Leachman, supra note 38, at 33–34.

51.

Id. at 34 (citation omitted).

52.

Id. at 36.

53.

Benford & Snow, supra note 17, at 616.

54.

Id.
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range of solutions and strategies that are deemed reasonable and possible to adopt.55 Prognostic beliefs do not form in a silo, but are often
shaped by the nature of solutions advocated by opponents, targets of
influence, the media, and bystanders.56
Whether a social movement defines a grievance as a violation of
individual or collective rights has an impact on the types of remedies
(i.e., prognostic beliefs) proposed by the legal frame.57 By framing grievances as collective harms reflecting in structural modes of oppression,
collective rights framing advocates for the adoption of status-conscious
legal protections that address the unique characteristics and, by extension, experiences, of the victimized group.58 In contrast, individual
rights frames’ emphasis on individual harm supports advocacy efforts
at securing legal remedies that focus on protecting individual rights,
regardless of group status.59
Often, movement actors shift between individual and collective
rights frames. In the reproductive-rights movement in the United
States, for example, movement actors first framed restrictions on reproductive health as a violation of women’s collective rights, emphasizing
the ways in which reproductive health, contraception, and abortion are
issues exclusive to the domain of women.60 Under a collective rights
frame, the uniqueness of womanhood and the vulnerabilities that come
with it were amplified, suggesting a need for status-based legal remedies.61 The framing of reproductive health issues eventually shifted over
time, with mainstream activists “situat[ing] abortion as a matter of
choice, which women, like men, should be able to exercise freely as
rights-bearing citizens.”62
By framing the issue of abortion in terms of individual rights, the
women’s reproductive-health movement shifted in the ways in which
they described their constituency. Activists no longer emphasized the
uniqueness of group status; rather, an individual rights frame drove
activists to instead highlight the similarities between men and women,
such as essential autonomy and rationality in decision-making.63 By

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 616–17.

57.

Id. at 616.

58.

Leachman, supra note 38, at 34.

59.

Id. at 35–36.

60.

Myra Marx Ferree, Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the
Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany, 109 Am. J. Socio.
304, 322 (2003).

61.

Id. at 335.

62.

Id. at 314.

63.

Id. at 315.
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downplaying the systematic biases that women face, the women’s reproductive rights movement shifted from a collective rights frame to an
individual rights frame, with the values of universal protection under
the law becoming a dominant organizing principle of the latter frame.64
B. Performativity and Legal Framing

To capture the constitutive effects of legal framing and avoid the
descriptive bias endemic to framing research, this Note adopts a
performative approach to the judicial framing of excessive force. The
understanding of performativity advanced here is rooted in the speechact theory of J.L. Austin, subsequently developed by scholars such as
Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, and exemplified by the work of
Karen Zivi.65 Austinian speech-act theory conceptualizes performative
utterances as those speech acts that, rather than simply describing an
already existing reality, work to construct reality through the uttering
process.66 The original examples of performative utterances provided by
Austin include saying “I do” in a marriage ceremony or “I bet” in a
game of poker.67 According to Austin, “if a person makes an utterance
of this sort we should say that he is doing something rather than merely
saying something.”68 By saying “I do,” an actor does not describe a
marriage, but creates and participates in it.69 Thus, a performative
approach is concerned less with what a particular utterance means than
what a particular utterance does.70
Applying a performative approach to discourse surrounding
Proposition 8, a gay marriage referendum in California,71 Zivi shifts
focus from whether or not a particular rights claim regarding gay marriage reflects legal or moral reality to what is done “[i]n and by making
a claim to th[e] right.”72 As a practice of persuasion as well as a social
and political practice, Zivi finds that rights claiming, like legal framing,
is contextual, inextricably linked with the identity and political subjecttivities of those making such claims.73 According to Zivi, rights claims

64.

Id. at 322–24; Leachman, supra note 38, at 36.

65.

Karen Zivi, Making Rights Claims 14 (2012).

66.

Id. at 8, 14–16.

67.

J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 5–6 (J.O. Urmson &
Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975).

68.

J.L. Austin, Performative Utterances, in Philosophical Papers 233,
235 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 2d ed. 1970).

69.

Zivi, supra note 65, at 17.

70.

Id. at 9.

71.

Voter Information Guide for 2008, General Election 128 (2008).

72.

Zivi, supra note 65, at 71–72 (emphasis added).

73.

Id. at 12.
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such as “I have the right to equality” are fundamentally political activities, with the political character of rights claiming extending beyond
the instrumental value of rights discourse.74 Rather, rights claiming is,
at its core, a political practice with constitutive and—potentially—
transformative dimensions.75
Adopting a performative approach to the framing of excessive force
jurisprudence allows scholars to analyze these constitutive and transformative dimensions. Through the process of framing police brutality
as a violation of, inter alia, the right to be free from unreasonable seizures or the right to equality under the law, the courts construct and
reaffirm the social identities of perpetrators and victims of police violence.76 In addition, because the “law may be the source of new expectations for existing relations,” such rights framing is not only constitutive
but potentially transformative as well.77 By making rights claims that
are intelligible, yet novel, aggrieved groups have the opportunity to
deploy existing legal categories and concepts in new or alternative ways.
When such reframing is codified by the courts, social and political identities and relationships may be transformed, demonstrating the power
of legal frames to foster change beyond a given social movement or
struggle.
C. Liberal Legalism as the Interpretive Context of Police Violence

Socio-legal scholars have documented the ubiquity of legal framing
across disparate social movements, particularly in the United States,
where rights discourse maintains high narrative fidelity with the legal
culture and consciousness of American society.78 Importantly, however,
not all rights discourse is treated equally. Rather, the type of legal
framing that has come to dominate social movements in the United
States and other Western capitalist democracies is primarily that of
individual rights framing, with the framing process informed by the
cultural landscape in which such movements are embedded.79 In the
United States, that landscape is shaped largely by the interpretive
reservoir of liberal legalism, which serves as a superordinate “master”

74.

Id. at 118–19.

75.

Id. at 84.

76.

For an overview on the connection between social identities and rights
framing, see generally Scott A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford & David A.
Snow, Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of
Movement Identities, in New Social Movements 185 (Enrique Laraña,
et al. eds., 1994).

77.

Lisa J. McIntyre, Law in the Sociological Enterprise: A
Reconstruction 113 (1994) (emphasis omitted).

78.

Benford & Snow, supra note 17, at 622–28.

79.

Id. at 628.
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frame from which movement-specific organizational frames are derived.80
The liberal legalist master frame that dominates Western social
movements exists as a kind of political common sense in liberal capitalist democratic countries.81 At the very foundation of the liberal-legalist
frame is a commitment to the equality of all individuals vis-à-vis the
state.82 The liberal theory of equality is intrinsically connected to negative liberty and individual autonomy.83 Liberty, according to liberal
theorists such as Rawls, is individual, negative, and pluralist in nature,
reflecting an understanding of the person as an autonomous moral agent
concerned with pursuing individual conceptions of the good.84 An individual’s enjoyment of liberty to realize his or her own conceptions of
the good is prioritized to the extent that such aims and preferences do
not infringe on the liberty of other individuals.85 As liberalism acknowledges a plurality of conceptions of “the good” exist, it holds that the
state should position itself according to the “maximum degree of noninterference [(negative liberty)] compatible with the minimum demands
of social life” in order to enable individuals, as separate persons, to
pursue their respective conceptions of the good.86 Equality, then, is
defined as equal distribution of negative liberty across individuals in a
given society.87
According to Michael Walzer, liberalism’s conception of the
individual as atomistic, isolated, and rational results in a language of
individual rights that unites these individual atoms within broader
society.88 Through specific discourse surrounding individual rights to
privacy, property, and voluntary association, amongst others, liberal
selves and communities are created that selectively reinforce those same
liberal rights and values. As Marcos Scauso asserts, through state
recognition and fostering of only those communities that validate liberal
principles of individual rights, “liberalism creates a bounded notion of

80.

Leachman, supra note 38, at 31.

81.

Shiraz Dossa, Liberal Legalism: Law, Culture, and Identity, 4 European
Legacy, no. 3, 1999, at 73, 83.

82.

Peter Hudson, Liberalism, Democracy, and Transformation in South
Africa, 27 Politikon 93, 94 (2000).

83.

See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 27 (1971).

84.

See id.

85.

Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 170 (1969).

86.

Id. at 161.

87.

Hudson, supra note 82, at 94.

88.

Marcos S. Scauso, Intersectional Decoloniality: Reimagining
International Relations and the Problem of Difference 21
(2021). See generally Michael Walzer, The Communication Critique of
Liberalism, 18 Pol. Theory 6 (1990).
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equality and freedom for those individuals and groups that are
‘rational.’”89 Equality, then, is granted “to those who fit within the
commonality of each ‘rationality,’” and withheld from those who exist
outside such liberal boundaries of rationality.90 “In turn, this form of
statecraft delineates who can access rights and who is an ‘other’ that
needs to be normalized, disciplined, assimilated, or killed.”91
The natural affinity between liberal theory and legalism and the
overlap in their core tenets positions legalism as the legal ideological
foundation for liberal politics. But what is legalism, precisely? As the
“logical and ideological offspring of liberal ideology”92 legalism has been
referred to as a legal theory, a professional ideology, and a meta
narrative of the law—as “law’s explanation of itself.”93 Judith Shklar
defines legalism as a commitment to “the ethical attitude that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships
to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”94 That is, legalism
insists on the morality of conduct that conforms with rules (i.e., laws)
established in the past, an insistence that positions the law as “simply
there—if one has a moral duty to obey rules, it must be the case that
the rules are there.”95
This definition suggests that legalism maintains an affinity to legal
formalism, which holds the law to be an objective, independent, closed
logical system, derived from the existence of a legal science that makes
possible the objective determination of disputes.96 Indeed, at the heart
of legalism (and liberal legality more broadly) is the formalist, positivist
view of the law as a determinable and empirical science, static and
universal in nature, merely waiting to be applied by legal actors to a
given case.97 Legalism, thus, depicts legal actors as mechanical decisionmakers and noncontributing agents of the law, waiting on the sidelines
to solve conflicts and grievances via a legal final solution.
As Shiraz Dossa notes, “the formal split between law and morals,
the primacy of individual liberty and autonomy and of right over the
good, the focus on the visibly factual (distinguished from values),
89.

Scauso, supra note 88, at 21.

90.

Id. at 22.

91.

Id. (citation omitted).

92.

Dossa, supra note 81, at 77.

93.

Narnia Bohler–Muller, Western Liberal Legalism and Its Discontents: A
Perspective From Post–Apartheid South Africa, 3 Socio–Legal Rev. 1,
5 (2007).

94.

Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials
1 (1964).

95.

Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 119, 120 (2003).

96.

Id. at 119.

97.

Id. at 120.
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constitute sacral tenets of liberal legality and politics.”98 Under a liberal
legalist framework, the law is seen as neutral and apolitical, with the
“assumed sanctity of the judicial torso” placing legal decision-making
outside of the realm of politics.99 Distinctly apolitical and divorced from
social context, the law, according to this frame, serves as the ultimate
protector of the free market by reinforcing the status quo through
unquestionable faith in the nature and purpose of the law.
Framing violence and oppression as the violation of individual
rights, with a narrow focus on political and civil rights, the liberalist
frame has served as the master frame for a variety of social movements,
which have drawn on these principles in the creation of movementspecific frames.100 The civil-rights frame, as with most individual rights
frames, was derived from the liberalist master frame and was deployed
by American civil-rights activists during the 1950s and 1960s to give
voice to their experiences with Jim Crow laws, widespread violence
against Black communities, and the pervasive legacy of slavery in
America.101 By depicting segregation, for example, as a violation of their
individual rights to equality before the law, civil-rights activists constructed a frame that resonated with the liberal values and constitutional principles deeply rooted in American political and legal culture.102
The civil-rights movement’s emphasis on individual rights rather than
collective rights reflects liberalism’s prioritization of abstract individualism over social differentiation.103 As Cathi Albertyn and Beth
Goldblatt note, “In liberal legalism, it is differentiation which is seen to
be the problem and the assumed objective is a society where equal
(meaning same) treatment is the norm and where racial and sexual
distinctions do not exist.”104 Thus, framing group-based discrimination
as a violation of individual rights allowed the civil-rights movement to
construct their grievances in a manner that resonated well with the
liberal values of United States political and legal culture.
Before turning to the specific impact of liberal legalism on the
Court’s framing of police violence, it is important to note that liberal
legalism is not a static interpretive resource. That is, “liberalism does

98.

Dossa, supra note 81, at 75.

99.

Id. at 73.

100. Leachman, supra note 38, at 33.
101. David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of
Protest, in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory 133, 146 (Aldon
D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
102. Id.
103. Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of
Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous
Jurisprudence of Equality, 14 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 248, 251 (1998).
104. Id. at 252.
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not itself come ready-made with particular constellations of legal arguments.”105 Liberal legalism, like all cultural frames, is subject to shifts
in its content, just as rights frames themselves shift in content across
time and space.106 Yet, as Justin Desautels-Stein suggests, “we can see
that [the mid-twentieth century] strain of civil rights law as performing
in the modern liberal style, even while there was nothing about the
style itself that necessitated the legal particulars.”107

II. Police Violence and the Fourth Amendment Frame
A. The Fourth Amendment Individual Rights Frame

With a liberal-legalist interpretive background informing its
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has addressed the question of what
constitutes excessive force only three times. In 1985, the Court began
its foray into Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in Tennesee
v. Garner,108 where an officer shot an eighth-grade Black boy in the
back of the head as he fled, unarmed, across the yard of a house where
a prowler was reported.109 Stating that the reasonableness of police use
of force required consideration of the “totality of the circumstances”
and a balancing of the individual interest in one’s own life against the
societal interest in effecting arrests, the Court held that it was
unreasonable to “seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting
him dead.”110
Four years after Garner, the Court in Graham v. Connor111
established the definitive framing of excessive force in the contemporary
age. Prior to Graham, excessive force had been addressed by the courts
through a variety of approaches, including the Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process guarantees.112 Rejecting substantive due process as
a legal vehicle for addressing excessive-force claims, the Graham Court
instead declared “that all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory
105. Justin Desautels–Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 Colum. J. Race &
L. 1, 31 n.147 (2012).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
109. Id. at 3–5 & n.2.
110. Id. at 9, 11.
111. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
112. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (considering police
misconduct under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and concluding that a violation exists when the officers’ conduct “shocks
the conscience”); Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829, 831–32 (9th
Cir. 1987); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1985),
overruled by Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987).
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stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”113 The reasonableness inquiry set forth in Graham is an objective one: “the question
is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.”114
Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court took up the issue of
excessive force once again in Scott v. Harris.115 Here, the Court faced
the question of whether, within the context of a high-speed chase following a speeding violation, an officer’s ramming of a suspect’s vehicle with
his police car, resulting in a collision and the paralysis of the suspect,
was unreasonable.116 Emphasizing the threat posed by Harris to police
officers and other motorists, the Court held that the officer’s use of
force was reasonable under the circumstances.117 Rejecting the notion
that Garner created a bright-line rule regulating the use of force against
fleeing suspects, the Court noted that the vast factual differences
between Garner and Scott made the former inapplicable.118 Instead, at
the center of its reasonableness inquiry was the “ad hoc balancing of
state and individual interests unconstrained by any specific criteria”119
put forth by Garner and affirmed in Graham.
B. Performative Frame Analysis

The diagnostic and prognostic beliefs found in the framing established by Graham and its progeny clearly reflect an individual rights
framing of excessive force. Recall that—whereas diagnostic beliefs refer
to a frame’s organizing principles regarding the nature of a given harm,
its perpetrators, and victimized group—prognostic beliefs refer to
beliefs about the remedy considered necessary.120
Importantly, a performative approach to excessive-force legal
framing requires going beyond merely describing the diagnostic and
prognostic beliefs of the Fourth Amendment frame. It requires further
considering what the courts do in and by saying that, within the context
of police brutality, individuals have the right to be free from unreasonable seizures. As the following subsections demonstrate, the Court’s use
of an individual rights frame to make sense of police violence has a
113. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
114. Id. at 396.
115. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
116. Id. at 374.
117. Id. at 386.
118. Id. at 382–83.
119. Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1119, 1137 (2008).
120. Benford & Snow, supra note 17, at 615.
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number of performative effects, including the individualization and
decontextualization of the victims of police brutality; the privileging of
the raced logic of white law enforcement while dismissing the racial
experiences of Black victims with police as irrelevant; distortions to the
reality of police officers and policing in the modern age; and the
individualization of pathways to redress what has become a structural
phenomenon.
1. Individualization of Police Violence’s Victims and Harm

What is the nature of the harm under the Fourth Amendment
frame? Under Graham, excessive force is (re)framed as a violation of an
individual’s right, under the Fourth Amendment, “to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”121 Referring to police
brutality as “physically intrusive governmental conduct” against an
individual,122 the Court placed state violence on par with the minimally
intrusive restraints on an individual’s liberty found in custodial arrests.
In linking excessive force to the judicial doctrine governing unreasonable seizures, the Graham Court individualized and decontextualized
the harm of police violence.
The individualizing nature of the Fourth Amendment and related
jurisprudence is derived from several sources, including its historical
origins in liberalism and its placement within the Bill of Rights. As
Osagie Obasogie and Zachary Newman note, the Fourth Amendment,
with its placement in the Bill of Rights—“a rights-granting framework
largely based on the conception of singular individuals being provided
singular rights”—historically governed the relationship between individuals (and their privacy interests) and the government.123 Historically,
the Fourth Amendment has functioned as a means of protecting the
individual right to individual security.124 Motivated in part by the use
of suspicionless writs of assistance by the British to combat smuggling
in the American colonies and consequent resentment by American colonists, the Framers enshrined in the Fourth Amendment “their strong
concern for the protection of the individual’s right to be free from
arbitrary and general searches and seizures,” favoring individual liberty
over collective security.125

121. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
122. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1988).
123. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1470.
124. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 255, 256 (2010) (“For most of the history of the United
States, the view that the Fourth Amendment served to protect individual
security—that it was an individual right—was so patently obvious that it
needed no support.”).
125. Id. at 260.
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While the Court has described the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment in expansive terms, including the inviolability of the
person, the right to privacy, and the right of free movement,126 each
reformulation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections references an
individual right to be secure.127 The history of the Fourth Amendment
and its subsequent treatment by the courts indicate that the scope of
its protections extend to individual persons seeking redress for unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. This framing implies
that the victims of excessive force, under a Fourth Amendment frame,
are atomistic, rather than any social group, and that the harm experienced occurs at the individual—rather than collective—level.
Such a framing results in an utter distortion of consequences of
police violence within the Black community. As Part IV discusses in
more detail, the harm that results from the murder of yet another Black
individual by the police extends beyond the direct victim, to the
broader Black community in the form of collective traumatization.
2. Reaffirmation of the Rights-Bearing Citizen as White

By adopting a reasonableness standard, Garner, Graham and their
progeny erase the salience of race for both the perpetrators and victims
of police brutality, while simultaneously reaffirming a construction of
the rights-bearing citizens as white.128 In contrast to the Court’s
position on race, race matters, for example, when it comes to a Black
person’s decision to flee from police,129 a police officer’s assessment of
the threat posed by a Black suspect,130 and a court’s decision as to the
126. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 672 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (personal dignity); Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506
U.S. 56, 63 n.8 (1992) (liberty); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 613 (1989) (freedom of movement); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 815–16 (1985) (freedom of movement); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
760 (1985) (personal dignity); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979) (privacy).
127. Clancy, supra note 124, at 261.
128. Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black
Person Standard for ‘Location Plus Evasion’ Terry Stops, 6 Mich. J.
Race & L. 355, 358 (2001).
129. Id. at 359–62 (noting that there are a number of legitimate, noncriminal
reasons for a Black person to flee from the police, including violence
avoidance and skepticism toward police).
130. A 1990 study, for example, reported that “over 56 percent of Americans”
perceive Black people as more “violence prone” than white people. Jody D.
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 787 (1994)
(discussing Tom W. Smith, Ethnic Images 4, 8 (Gen. Soc. Surv. Project,
Topical Report No. 19, 1990), https://gss.norc.org/Documents/reports/
topical-reports/TR19.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT2U-CBFH]); see also
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
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reasonableness of a police officer’s judgment.131 Yet, courts have continuously adopted a colorblind approach to police-citizen encounters,132
with the regulation of police conduct made at the expense of and “on
the back of blacks.”133 Through Graham’s objective reasonableness
standard, the courts “regularly adjudicate[] cases that involve and
impact African-Americans without expressly engaging how members of
that community perceive and experience the police.”134
The Tenth Circuit, for example, has explicitly excluded race from
reasonable-person inquiries on the grounds that “there is no uniform
way to apply a reasonable person test that adequately accounts for
racial differences consistent with an objective standard for Fourth
Amendment seizures.”135 By confining the consideration of race to
assessments of the voluntariness of statements made to the police, the
Tenth Circuit deemed irrelevant the fact that, for many Black individuals, “the sight of an officer in uniform evokes a sense of fear and
trepidation, rather than security.”136 The reasonable-person analysis,
premised on Anglo and Western European cultural, political, and
economic norms and values, ultimately functions as a tool of white
supremacy, working to perpetuate racial exclusion by demanding that
Black individuals “comport themselves as a reasonable person that

Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956, 983–91 (1999) (discussing social
science research on the role of cognitive schema and categorization on
perceptions by police officers of Black people as more likely to engage in
criminal conduct); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some
Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race
Matter?, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243, 243 n.2 (discussing six studies over the
course of three decades that verify police officers’ negative attitudes and
feelings of anxiety toward Blacks).
131. Carpiniello, supra note 128, 368.
132. See, e.g., Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 22 (1985) (erasing the racial
dimension from the analysis of the reasonableness of an officer’s decision
to use deadly force against an unarmed, nonthreatening fleeing suspect).
133. Devon W. Carbado, Race and the Fourth Amendment, in 4 Acad. for
Just., Reforming Criminal Justice: Punishment, Incarceration,
and Release 153, 182 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (quoting Toni Morrison, On
the Backs of Blacks, Time (Dec. 2, 1993), http://content.time.com/time/
subscriber/article/0,33009,979736,00.html [https://perma.cc/3H23-BVUA]).
134. Id.; see, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1973) (the decision to
chase); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (the decision to
follow and approach, and question generally); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429 (1991) (the decision to question on a bus); United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194 (2002) (the decision to not inform defendants of the right to
not cooperate).
135. United States v. Easley, 911 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 2018).
136. Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority
Neighborhoods: No Place for a “Reasonable Person,” 36 How. L.J. 239,
247 (1993).
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bears very little resemblance to their lived reality.”137 As such, the
Fourth Amendment’s framing of police brutality as an unreasonable
seizure decontextualizes the victims of state-sponsored violence, erasing
the culturally-rooted racial logics that shape Black American’s behavior
in police-citizen encounters.
At the same time, despite purporting to be race-neutral and
objective, courts considering excessive force under a Fourth Amendment frame privilege the “raced” logic of police officers, thereby
reinforcing white cultural norms about blackness as inherently criminal.
For example, in Illinois v.Wardlow,138 a location-plus-evasion case, the
Court held that a Black defendant’s fleeing from police officers in a
known drug trafficking area in Chicago constituted reasonable and
articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop of the defendant.139 As Mia
Carpiniello asserts, by characterizing a white police officer’s perception
of the Black defendant as “commonsensical,”140 the Court reveals its
racial bias toward white America implicit in its avowedly colorblind
application of the Fourth Amendment.141
Behaviors such as running are, in actuality, implicitly racialized. As
the May 2020 murder of Ahmaud Arbery in Georgia reflects, Black
individuals engaged in exercise are more likely to be perceived as fleeing
a crime and posing a threat than their white counterparts.142 This is
due, in part, to the pervasive association in America between blackness
and criminality, which can lead “people [to] evaluate ambiguous actions
performed by non-[w]hites as suspicious and criminal while identical
actions performed by [w]hites go unnoticed.”143 When assessing the reasonableness of a seizure, the Court relies primarily on “the officer’s
137. Scott Astrada & Marvin L. Astrada, The Enduring Problem of the RaceBlind Reasonable Person, Am. Const. Soc’y: Expert Forum (May 11,
2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-enduring-problem-of-therace-blind-reasonable-person/ [https://perma.cc/L6GL-6GRQ].
138. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
139. Id. at 121–25.
140. Carpiniello, supra note 128, at 370 (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 128).
141. Id. at 368.
142. Natalia Mehlman Petrzela, Opinion, Jogging Has Always Excluded Black
People, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/
12/opinion/running-jogging-race-ahmaud-arbery.html [https://perma.cc/
2PVJ-6QCS].
143. L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87
Ind. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2012); see also Vincent J. Roscigno & Kayla PreitoHodge, Racist Cops, Vested “Blue” Interests, or Both? Evidence from
Four Decades of the General Social Survey, Socius: Socio. Rsch. for
Dynamic World (2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/
2378023120980913. Through statistical analysis, Roscigno and PreitoHodge reflect on “how much police stand out as unique and in ways that
support the contention that their worldviews are more racist in character.”
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construction of his perception of threat and his suspicion of criminal
activity . . . [thereby] accept[ing] racial affect that portrays blacks as
reasonably feared or suspected of criminality.144 As Valdez and
colleagues aptly characterize, “blackness—intelligible primarily as ‘the
presumed danger it poses to public welfare’—is the ultimate object of,
and justification for, police power.”145 This avowedly racial logic held
by American society at large, as well as individual police officers, is
deemed reasonable under the broad standard set forth by the Graham
Court and adopted in subsequent decisions.
In Whren v. United States,146 the Court doubled down on its
privileging of the racial logic of the white majority in America. In
Whren, the Supreme Court held that an officer’s subjective racial
animus, as a motivation to stop a defendant, is irrelevant to the
assessment of the reasonableness, and by extension, the constitutionality of the seizure.147 By erasing the explicit racial logic of law
enforcement, the Court effectively “legalized . . . reliance on affective
priors regarding the threat and criminality of Blacks to guide
policing.”148 Furthermore, “to the extent that the deciding body—most
typically a judge, but sometimes a jury or grand jury—shares the racial
affect that perceives blackness as a threat, the law creates systemic
incentives for police officers to exaggerate racialized narratives afterthe-fact to obtain legal cover for violence.”149 Combined with the
doctrine of qualified immunity, the Court’s deference to officers’ racialized perceptions of Black bodies has provided law enforcement with “an
absolute shield . . . [thereby] gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment.”150
What are the performative impacts of this double standard embedded in the colorblind jurisprudence of the Court? Recognizing the
performative character of rights claims forces a reconceptualization of
the contours of U.S. citizenship. Whereas traditional conceptualizations
of citizenship portray citizenship as a relatively stable legal institution
defined by rights and centered around a relationship with the state, a

Id. These worldviews are most prevalent in white and male officers, who
make up the majority of law enforcement officers in America. Id.
144. Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman & Amna Akbar, Law, Police Violence, and
Race: Grounding and Embodying the State of Exception, 23 Theory &
Event 902, 922–23 (2020).
145. Id. at 919.
146. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
147. Id. at 820.
148. Valdez et al., supra note 144, at 923.
149. Id. at 924.
150. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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theory of performativity suggests that citizenship, because it is constitutive of rights, is inherently unstable, contestable, and something that
must be exercised, enacted, and, thus, performed.151 According to Engin
Isin, since the 18th century, beginning in Euro-America, the dominant
group associated with modern citizenship is “propertied, adult, male,
rational, white, Christian, heterosexual, and able-bodied”—an association that has had the natural effect of disqualifying from citizenship
those that exist outside of this dominant group.152 Historically, other
social groups such as the poor, Black, queer, and non-Christian were
perceived as “not capable of fulfilling the duties of citizenship and hence
acting as citizens.” 153
Within the context of police violence, the reasonable-person
standard and the privileging of the raced logic of law-enforcement
officers results in a further dispossession of Black Americans from the
rights constitutive of citizenship in the United States. The Court deems
Black Americans’ historical experiences of violence and trauma at the
hands of law enforcement as irrational and irrelevant to legal judgments
about the use of force, while simultaneously affording the racial biases
held by officers significant weight in the reasonableness calculus. This
double standard results in a reaffirmation of the hegemonic image of
the rights-bearing citizen in the United States as white and furthers the
legal marginalization of Black Americans.
3. Distortion of the Causes of Police Violence

Just as the reasonable-person standard distorts victims of police
brutality by isolating “suspicious” behavior of Black people from its
cultural and racial contexts, the Court’s Fourth Amendment framing
of excessive force warps contemporary understandings of officers’ decisions to use force through its deference to an individual officer’s
judgment at the scene. Notably, the Graham Court observed that “[t]he
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”154 Thus,
Graham locates the responsibility for use-of-force decisions, including
the use of excessive force, within the individual officer.
151. Gurchathen Sanghera, Katherine Botterill, Peter Hopkins & Rowena
Arshad, ‘Living Rights,’ Rights Claims, Performative Citizenship and
Young People—The Right to Vote in the Scottish Independence
Referendum, 22 Citizenship Stud. 540, 540 (2018) (“[R]ights are fundamental to citizenship, which is practised both with the enacting of rights
and by claiming them.” (citations omitted)).
152. Engin Isin, Performative Citizenship, in The Oxford Handbook of
Citizenship 500, 502–03 (Ayelet Shachar et al. eds., 2017).
153. Id. at 503.
154. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
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In Brower v. County of Inyo,155 the Court clarified its definition of
excessive force as a seizure when it considered a Fourth Amendment
claim brought under § 1983 after an eluding suspect crashed into a
roadblock put in place by police and was killed.156 The Court held that
a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “only when there is governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied.”157 Thus, excessive force under a Fourth Amendment frame
results from intentional acts by independent law enforcement agents to
terminate an individual’s freedom of movement. As Devon Carbado has
criticized, the Court created “a relatively high bar for when police
conduct constitutes a seizure. The higher the bar, the narrower the
Fourth Amendment boundary between the police and the people—and
the greater the discretion police officers have to decide how to engage
[with African-Americans].”158
While Carbado is correct in his observation that the Court’s
definition of seizure increases the discretionary power of officers vis-àvis the Black community, this framing endows individual officers with
a degree of agency that ultimately distorts the dual nature of perpetrators of excessive force. As Rachel Harmon notes, policing is, in
reality, characterized by both state authority and human agency:
Police officers use force as an authorized form of state coercion,
but they do so in tense and often emotionally charged interpersonal encounters. An officer using force to arrest a subject is
neither entirely a neutral actor, detached and disinterested,
charged with carrying out the will of the state, nor entirely an
individual acting in the heat of the moment, vulnerable and in
harm’s way, perhaps vengeful and afraid. Strangely but inevitably, he is both.159

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on police violence ignores this
duality inherent in policing, with the Court and commentators instead
framing excessive force as the result of intentional decision-making of
individuals, rather than acknowledging the dual nature of police
violence perpetration: systemic and individual.160

155. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
156. Id. at 594, 599.
157. Id. at 597.
158. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence, supra note 8, at 1506.
159. Harmon, supra note 119, at 1121 (footnote omitted).
160. See Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans
to Police Violence?, 51 Harv. C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 159, 161 & n.3 (2016)
(noting that “[commentators] continue to frame excessive force as a
problem that derives from rogue police officers who harbor racial animus
against African Americans” and collecting commentary).
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Such framing, according to Carbado and Patrick Rock, “obscures
the structural dimensions of police violence and ignores significant
empirical evidence . . . suggesting that conscious racial animosity likely
only accounts for a small percentage of racially-motivated conduct.”161
Indeed, as Akhil Reed Amar notes, due to the “vastly increased bureaucratic density” of the 19th and 20th centuries, “[t]he true locus of
decision-making authority [regarding police search and seizure conduct]
has shifted from the individual to the organization.”162 The importance
of police departments, their policies and procedures regarding the use
of force, and other structural aspects of these organizations is underemphasized within the Fourth Amendment framing of police brutality.

III. Police Violence and the Equal Protection Frame
As Obasogie and Newman aptly note, the extant literature consists
primarily of critiques of the Fourth Amendment framing of excessive
force, “with little discussion of the potential of the Fourteenth Amendment—specifically, equal protection—to address the use of force as” a
deeply structural issue shaped by racialized group dynamics.163 This
dearth in scholarly discussions about the utility of the Equal Protection
Clause in remedying the structural aspects of police brutality is understandable, given the Graham decision’s preclusion of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a relevant frame for understanding excessive force in
seizure contexts. The doctrinal choices of the Supreme Court in Graham
and subsequent excessive-force cases created a constitutional environment unconducive to equal-protection claims of Black victims.
The Graham decision effectively precludes the use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as a viable rights frame
for victims of police brutality. The impact of Graham on channeling
police violence claims into the Fourth Amendment frame has been
profound on lower-court jurisprudence. Prior to Graham, the courts
were open to a multiplicity of framings of excessive force, with plaintiffs
relying on the Fourth Amendment in some contexts and the Fourteenth
Amendment in others.164 Post-Graham, however, lower courts turned
away from a Fourteenth Amendment framing of police violence, relying
161. Id. at 161–62 (drawing on social psychological research in the construction
of a theoretical model that integrates the individual and structural predicates of police violence).
162. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 757, 813 (1994).
163. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1478.
164. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 7, at 1485 (“Only 28.0% of the qualifying
pre–Graham cases include a discussion of the Fourth Amendment. . . . .
[T]he Supreme Court . . . moved [post–Graham] away from examining police
violence matters through the Fourteenth Amendment (decreasing from
40.0% to 25.6%) . . . .”).
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instead on a Fourth Amendment frame in approximately 90% of cases
in the period following Graham.165
The following discussion delineates the content of the current Equal
Protection frame constructed by the Court, before turning to a performative frame analysis of such a framing of police violence. Notably, since
the Court’s interpretation of equal protection under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments is embedded within—and highly influenced
by—the broader legal culture predominant in American society (i.e.,
liberal legalism), much of the same critiques made of the Fourth
Amendment frame remain relevant with respect to the equal-protection
frame. Both the Fourth Amendment and equal-protection frames view
police violence as a violation of individual rights, thereby reconstructing
the nature and experience of police brutality in historical, decontextualized terms, with the pervasive murders of Black people at the hands
of the state attributed to intentional acts of discrimination.
A. The Equal Protection Individual Rights Frame

To view police brutality against Black people as a violation of their
constitutional right to equal protection of the law is to continue the
Fourth Amendment tradition of framing police violence as an individual
rights violation. That is, the harm endured by Black people at the
hands of the police remains localized—within the domain of the individual, rather than the community. This atomistic framing, informed
by liberal legalism’s predominant focus on the relationship between the
individual and the state, is reflected both in the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent judicial interpretations of the
clause’s constitutional demands.166
The language of the Equal Protection Clause itself prohibits states
from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”167 In Shelley v. Kraemer,168 the Supreme Court echoed this
liberal legalistic interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Faced
with the question of whether judicial enforcement of a covenant restricting the sale of property to non-Black people violated the Equal
Protection Clause,169 the Court noted that “[t]he rights created by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed

165. Id.
166. See infra Part IV. As Part IV discusses, however, this surface level reading
of the text of the Equal Protection Clause is not the only interpretation
of the Amendment. Indeed, as the legislative history of the Amendment
confirms, the Fourteenth Amendment may be read as a status–based
corrective amendment requiring attention to differences in the positionality
of racial groups in America.
167. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
168. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
169. Id. at 4.
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to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.”170 Thirty
years later, Justice Powell, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,171 an affirmative-action-in-higher-education case, further endorsed an individual rights framing of equal protection: “If it is the
individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because
of his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards
may be applied consistently.”172
Robert Farrell argues that individual-rights interpretations of the
Court’s treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment are “misleading and
unnecessary,”173 citing a number of Court decisions as “very strong
evidence that the Equal Protection Clause does not protect individual
rights” but rather functions solely as a “limit on government classification.”174 To Farrell, even in cases such as Shelley and Bakke, where
individual-rights language is prominent in the Court’s opinions, the
Justices’ own recognition of the class-based nature of the issues before
them undermines the importance of such individual-rights discussions
to the court’s ultimate holdings, and, by extension, contemporary understandings of the very rights protected by Fourteenth Amendment.175
While Farrell correctly observes that Shelley “involved a challenge
to a racial classification, not a claim of harm to an individual person,”176
his focus on the necessity of individual-rights interpretations of equal
protection to deciding the constitutionality of racial classifications
obscures the performative salience of such discussions to the construction of modern police brutality and its aftermath. From a performative
perspective, the framing of the Equal Protection Clause as a mechanism
of individual-rights protection, is a form of legal speech that acts. By
continuing to affirm, through the courts, the individualistic nature of
the rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
continues to construct Black victims of police brutality as individuals,
isolated from the collective traumatization that weighs on the broader
Black community.
Indeed, while the Court rightfully locates the undesired results of
discriminatory classifications at the group level, the Court refrains from
reconstructing the harm experienced by victims of police brutality in
170. Id. at 22.
171. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
172. Id. at 299.
173. Robert C. Farrell, Affirmative Action and the “Individual” Right to Equal
Protection, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 241, 264 (2009).
174. Id. at 263–64.
175. Id. at 264–67.
176. Id. at 265.
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truly collective terms. Even when facing the sword of the Equal
Protection Clause, held at the subaltern’s side, the Court ultimately
conceptualizes the harm of excessive force as an invasion of an
individual’s, rather than a group’s, right. Thus, while government
classifications along racial and national-origin lines trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny of such classifications for compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause,177 this scrutiny still conceptualizes the harm it seeks
to remedy in individualized terms, distorting the nature of police brutality, its victims, and its consequences in the process.
B. Performative Frame Analysis

While the potential of an equal-protection frame as an alternative
interpretive resource of excessive-force claims remains understudied, the
potentiality of an equal-protection framing of police violence remains
limited by its commitment to liberal legalism’s emphasis on individual
rights. A performative frame analysis of judicial treatment of equalprotection claims with respect to police brutality brings to the forefront
a disappointing recognition that the Equal Protection Clause frame,
like its Fourth Amendment counterpart, remains deeply individualizing
and decontextualizing, unable to account for the systemic causes of the
phenomenon. This inability stems largely from Supreme Court jurisprudence and subsequent lower-court interpretations of this case law
that conceptualizes racism in traditional terms and requires discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny of state action with respect to race.
The meaning lawyers impute to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection is restricted by the interpretive milieu in
which it is deployed—one dominated by liberal legalism. Indeed, equal
protection, in its current construction, is informed significantly by
liberal legalism’s traditional construction of racism as a volitional
phenomenon, one characterized by prejudice, intent, and active discrimination.178 This understanding of racism—referred to by William
Wiecek as “traditional racism”179—is reflected in the (few) decisions of
post-Graham lower courts that actually address a plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims with respect to police brutality.180 Traditional
racism, according to Wiecek, “focuses on an individual with a bad
attitude. It assumes that the racist is aware of his beliefs and by acting
on them, intends to bring about discriminatory results for the victim.”181

177. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
178. William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today:
An Introduction, 100 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 (2011).
179. Id. at 3–5.
180. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
181. Wiecek, supra 178, at 4.
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Traditional racism, as this section discusses, is at the heart of an equalprotection framing of excessive force.
The diagnostic beliefs embedded in an equal-protection frame are
also significantly informed by the interpretive foundation established in
Washington v. Davis,182 a case unrelated to police brutality. Prior to
Davis, the Court had not addressed the question of whether disparate
impact of state action provided sufficient grounds to establish equalprotection liability.183 During this time, however, lower federal courts
viewed state actions with discriminatory racial impact as creating a
suspect classification, thereby subjecting the action to strict scrutiny.184
Davis settled the question of discriminatory impact’s role in equal
protection assessments.
In Davis, the plaintiffs—Black applicants to the Washington D.C.
police force—alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, citing
statistics demonstrating that Black applicants failed the police examination at a much greater rate than their white counterparts.185 While
noting disproportionate impact was not irrelevant to an inference of
discriminatory purpose, the Court held that disparate impact was
insufficient, by itself, to support claims about the existence of a racial
classification: discriminatory impact, “[s]tanding alone, does not trigger
the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.”186
Rather, “the basic equal protection principle [requires] that the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”187
Davis—combined with existing case law on equal protection’s
scrutiny standards, which were well established by 1976188—resulted in
state action that is facially neutral with respect to race receiving
heightened judicial deference (i.e., rational-basis review), unless there
is evidence of discriminatory intent beyond disparate impact.189 The
182. 426 U.S. at 242.
183. Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and
Equal Protection Law, 92 Yale L.J. 328, 331 (1982).
184. Id.
185. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.
186. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 240.
188. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311–12 (1976).
189. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1059, 1081 (2011). For
additional cases in which the Court has held that discriminatory impact
is insufficient to establish a racial classification and trigger strict scrutiny
see, for example, City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 56 (1980), which
rejected findings of discriminatory impact, alone, as indicative of purposeful discrimination.
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Court reaffirmed this requirement of discriminatory purpose in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,190 where the
Court mandated that lawmakers must have enacted a law “in part
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”191 Feeney also limited the ability of the courts to
rely on foreseeability of disparate impact as indicative of intent to
discriminate.192 Thus, the Court virtually eliminated any potential role
that disparate impact might have played in equal-protection analysis
of the courts.193 This articulation of the discriminatory-purpose requirement in Davis and its progeny has reaffirmed the Fourth Amendment’s
construction of police brutality as a conscious decision by individual
officers, reflecting liberal legalism’s traditional construction of racism.
In Jackson v. City of Pittsburgh,194 where a white officer assaulted
a Black person during a traffic stop,195 a U.S. District Court in
Pennsylvania rejected the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
because “the officers did not make any sort of racist remarks to him.”196
Similarly, in a suit brought by a Black plaintiff alleging excessive force,
the plaintiff’s equal-protection claim failed because, according to the
court, “none of the officers made any derogatory racial remarks to
[him].”197 As these cases intimate, the Equal Protection Clause, in its
current formulation, holds overt evidence of racial animus (i.e., racist
remarks) as a proxy for discriminatory intent. The courts place
traditional racism front and center in equal-protection jurisprudence,
continuing the Fourth Amendment frame’s construction of police
violence as an intentional act by rogue officers whose racial animus
motivated the rights violation. Not only does this place a high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs, who must provide proof of such overt racism,
but this framing obscures the roles of both implicit bias and structural
racism as contributing factors of excessive force incidents against Black
people.

190. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
191. Id. at 279.
192. Id. at 279 n.25.
193. Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality
of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 653, 661–62
(2015).
194. 688 F. Supp. 2d 379 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
195. Id. at 385.
196. Id. at 395.
197. Loharsingh v. City and County of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1080,
1106 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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IV. Recommendation: Reframe Equal Protection
as a Collective Right
The Court’s current interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
constructs police brutality as a violation of an individual’s personal
right to equality before the law—but an individual rights frame is not
the only possible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections. Indeed, as this section argues, police violence against Black
people is better understood as a violation of the Black community’s
collective right to equal protection of the law. Recall that collective
rights frames define a given harm as a violation of the status-based
rights of a group, emphasizing—rather than downplaying—the unique
experiences of a group with marginalization in order to legitimize
demands for status-based legal protections.198 As with individual rights
frames, collective rights frames do so by proposing alternative diagnostic beliefs. What might such a reframing look like?
A. Reconstructing the Nature of Police Brutality

The diagnostic beliefs of a collective rights framing of equal
protection consist of several propositions regarding the nature of and
harm imposed by police brutality. First, the nature of police brutality
is not, at its core, an (il)legal intervention, but rather, gratuitous state
violence perpetuated against the Black community.199
1. Reframing Excessive Force as Gratuitous State Violence

Police violence against the Black community is not merely excessive, but gratuitous, anchored in an anti-Black system of white supremacy that is predicated on the refusal to recognize Black humanity.200
198. See supra Part I(A)(1).
199. This notion builds on ideas developed by Zach Newman. See Zach
Newman, Note, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force, and
Equal Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 Hastings Const. L.Q.
117, 131–33 (2015) (concluding that “police ‘violence’ is violence”). While
Newman aptly notes that a reconceptualization of excessive force as
violence is necessary to diminishing “the unimpeachable legitimacy of the
police,” denoting such brutality as merely violence obscures the role of the
state in enacting technologies of violence against the Black community.
Id. at 133. L. Song Richardson and Phillip Atiba Goff get closer to
capturing the role of power and dominance in police brutality, relying on
the term “hegemonic racial violence . . . to define the violence perpetrated
by dominant group members, such as white individuals and the police,
against racially subordinated individuals.” L. Song Richardson & Phillip
Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 115,
118 (2014).
200. “Anti–blackness describes the inability to recognize black humanity. It
captures the reality that the kind of violence that saturates black life is
not based on any specific thing a black person—better described as ‘a
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Gratuitous violence may be contrasted with contingent violence:
whereas the latter occurs after some breach in the symbolic order, the
former “precedes and exceeds Blacks.”201 That is, gratuitous violence is
senseless violence, with no penological goal justifying its deployment.
The murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police exemplifies this kind
of violence; in no way can the use deadly violence a Black man be
justified by his alleged crime of using a counterfeit check.202
Yet, such instances of gratuitous violence against Black people
occur because “the structure of antiblackness [in America] positions
black people as subhuman . . . black people are targeted for what blackness represents socially, not for what they may or may not be doing
individually.”203 Blackness—to white people (and to some extent, other
non-Black racial groups)—is a necessary predicate for white identity
construction; indeed, the definition of another as “non-white” is at “the
core of white self-definition.”204 The implications of this “ontological
paradox,” in which white people rely on the denigration and subjugation of Black people in order to maintain whiteness as an identity of
supremacy are profound within the context of violence against Blacks.
Within this system of identity construction, physical violence is
essential.205 As Steve Martinot notes, “[t]he other is both placed at the
center of white identity and continually evicted from it. And because it
is a self-generated attribute of white identity, this violence is always
gratuitous. It marks the need to continually reconstitute white identity
as autonomous, precisely because it is dependent.”206 Police violence,
then, continues to be perpetuated by the state and its agents, long after

person who has been racialized black’—did. The violence we experience
isn’t tied to any particular transgression. It’s gratuitous and unrelenting.”
Kihana Miraya Ross, Opinion, Call It What It Is: Anti–Blackness, N.Y.
Times (June 4, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/
george–floyd–anti–blackness.html [https://perma.cc/GN9R-A6W3].
201. Frank B. Wilderson III, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the
Structure of U.S. Antagonisms 76 (2010).
202. Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley
Willis & Robin Stein, How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/
george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/79AK-Y87A].
203. Tryon P. Woods, Blackhood Against the Police Power:
Punishment and Disavowal in the “Post–Racial” Era 221–22
(2019) (“[O]nly sentient beings constructed as nonhuman objects are
subjected to gratuitous, rather than contingent, violence.”).
204. Steve Martinot, White Skin, White Affect: Redundancy, Obsession, and
Gratuitous Violence, Open Computing Facility https://www.ocf.
berkeley.edu/~marto/affect.htm [https://perma.cc/W2QM-ELYX] (last
visited May 5, 2022).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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the end of formal chattel slavery, because the existence and psychic
health of whites in America is based so firmly on gratuitous violence
against Black people that the mere existence of Black people requires
violence in order to sustain whiteness as an identity.207
Reframing excessive force as gratuitous requires a further
reconceptualization of police brutality as state violence. The notion that
police brutality is state violence is not new, but, rather, is a conceptualization underutilized in contemporary legal discussions of such violence.
Indeed, elsewhere in the social sciences, scholars have described police
brutality as “a form of unwarranted physical violence perpetrated by
an individual or group symbolically representing a government sanctioned, law enforcement agency as opposed to an individual perpetrator
who only represents themselves.”208
Excessive force is state violence. As an arm of the state, police
officers and departments conduct themselves under the color of law, as
state agents, thereby imbuing their acts of state violence with meaning
distinct from that of private violence.209 As the Court noted in Bivens,210
“power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is
wrongfully used. An agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the
name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his
own.”211 David Kennedy succinctly captures the special meaning
attached to state violence:
It is simply a statement of the human condition to say: people
will forever and always kill each other, no matter how hard we
try to prevent it. If we say: our government will forever and
always kill us, and beat us, and do us violence under color of law,
no matter how hard we try to prevent it, that is fundamentally
different. That is an admission and an acceptance of the failure
of the state of our democracy, and the American experiment.212

As part of the social contract endowing the democratic state with
sovereign authority, citizens give up their natural rights to violent self207. Id.
208. Thema Bryant‐Davis, Tyonna Adams, Adriana Alejandre, and Anthea A.
Gray, The Trauma Lens of Police Violence Against Racial and Ethnic
Minorities, 73 J. Soc. Issues 852, 853 (2017).
209. David M. Kennedy, State Violence, Legitimacy, and the Path to True Public
Safety, Niskanen Center (July 8, 2020), https://www.niskanencenter.org/
state-violence-legitimacy-and-the-path-to-true-public-safety/ [https://
perma.cc/U396-A6DF].
210. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
211. Id. at 392.
212. Kennedy, supra note 209.
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help (i.e., private violence) and accept the state’s “monopoly of the
legitimate use” of violence.213 The state, in turn, promises to protect
citizens from illegitimate violence by the state214 and private violence
by fellow citizens.215 Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness equation, bolstered by the doctrine of qualified immunity, results
in the classification of most police violence as legitimate, and therefore,
denoted as a “legal intervention,” rather than actual violence.216 Reframing excessive force as state violence brings the role of the state—
the alleged watchman—to the forefront, localizing responsibility for
such brutality in the state.
2. Police Brutality as the Deprivation of the Black Community’s
Entry Rights

Further, reframing equal protection as a collective right forces a
reconceptualization of the types of rights violations that occur when
state agents inflict gratuitous violence against the Black community.
Police violence is neither an unreasonable seizure nor an impermissible
government classification. Rather, such state violence is, at its core, a
deprivation of what West terms “rights to enter civil society.”217 Civil
rights are one category of entry rights—that is, rights of participation,
inclusion, membership and belonging. Drawing on Thomas Paine’s
Rights of Man, West notes “three defining attributes” of civil rights as
entry rights: “they are (1) natural rights (2) that arise by virtue of one’s
membership in society, and (3) that cannot be enforced or protected on
their own.”218 According to West, civil rights are “rights to enter civil
society”; that is, “rights to law, rather than rights to be free of law,”
213. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology 77, 78 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1958) (emphasis
removed); Liliya Abramchayev, Note, A Social Contract Argument for
the State's Duty to Protect from Private Violence, 18 St. John’s J.
Legal Comment. 849, 849–52 (2004).
214. Newman, supra note 27, at 131–33.
215. Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 893, 898–99 (2014)
(“[T]he simple yet powerful image of the state as a watchman lies at the
core of the social contract. In exchange for relinquishing our natural rights
to violent self-help, which is destructive of communal life, the watchman
promises to protect us and our property from private violence . . . [T]he
foundational civil right of the individual to look to the state for protection,
as well as the obligation of the state to provide such protection . . . are
not just essential to, but constitutive of, civil society.”).
216. Newman, supra note 27, at 131–132 (“Police forces use a ‘legitimate’
violence when using fatal force against individuals. This legitimate violence
is a ‘legal intervention,’ a numerical event tabulated by the Center for
Health Services.”).
217. For an introduction to West’s concept of “rights to enter civil society,”
see West, supra note 215, at 905–06.
218. Id.
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and the protection of the state against private violence.219 It would be
a mistake, however, to limit West’s conceptualization of civil rights to
the right to physical security in the face of private violence. Rather,
civil rights, as entry rights, include the right to be free from illegitimate
state violence. Indeed, the civil right to physical security is a natural
right held, not by virtue of an individual’s humanity, but by virtue of
their membership in a state—a membership that comes with the
relinquishment of self-help in exchange for such protection.220 Just as
with state enforcement of the right to be free from private violence,
state enforcement of the right to be free from state violence allows Black
people to “enter civil society and as . . . equal[s]. Without [such
enforcement], either we are slaves to whomever has legal violent power
over us or we are out in the cold” and are thrust into a state of effective
slavery.221
A collective reframing of equal protection centers the notion that
Black people in America have historically existed in this state of
effective slavery, a condition reaffirmed every time government agents
tasked with serving and protecting us beat and brutalize us instead.
Such constant brutalization at the hands of the state has devastating
effects beyond the direct victim. The subsequent traumatization of
Black people from police violence exists at individual and collective
levels. At the individual level, evidence demonstrates that Black
persons may suffer from greater rates of PTSD, generalized anxiety,
and stressor-induced depression than the population.222 This disproportionality results from both direct experience with police violence as well
as experiencing such violence vicariously, as the moments of victims’
last breaths are broadcast to cellphones across the country.223 Yet, the
219. Id. at 906, 909 (emphasis omitted) (discussing Thomas Paine, Rights of
Man 69 (Eric Foner & Henry Collins eds., Penguin Books 1984) (1791–92)).
220. Id. at 908–09.
221. Id.
222. Bryant-Davis et al., supra note 208, at 857 (citing Janet E. Helms, Guerda
Nicolas, & Carlton E. Green, Racism and Ethnoviolence as Trauma:
Enhancing Professional and Research Training, 18 Traumatology 65,
66 (2012)).
223. Kenya Downs, When Black Death Goes Viral, It Can Trigger PTSD-like
Trauma, PBS News Hour, (July 22, 2016, 8:04 PM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/black–pain–gone–viral–racism–graphic–videos–can–create–
ptsd–like–trauma [https://perma.cc/D9WR-7GZZ] (discussing symptoms
and prevalence of PTSD and similar psychological issues among Black
people, and describing an activist who said, “I hadn’t had nightmares
about Ferguson and tear gas or protests for a long time, but they came
back when I saw those videos [of Alton Sterling and Philando Castile’s
killings]”); see also Jacob Bor, Atheendar S. Venkataramani, David R.
Williams, & Alexander C. Tsai, Police Killings and Their Spillover Effects
on the Mental Health of Black Americans: A Population-Based, Quasi-
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direct-injury requirements embedded in both the Fourth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause’s individual rights frames suggest
these frames are unable to capture the psychological impact of this
rights violation as it pertains to anyone beyond the direct victim.
Collective traumas—analytically distinct from their individual
counterparts—exist at the level of the group and result from “blow[s]”
to the essence of a community, with damage concentrated in the social
“tissues” that bind human groups together, keep communities intact,
and inform how individuals relate to the world.224 The history and
persistence of police violence against the Black community in the
United States has served as a source of collective traumatization by
virtue of the damage such state-sponsored violence inflicts on the social
ties connecting the Black community to broader American society and
the state itself.225
As with most events that cause collective trauma, police violence
brings about a “realization that the community no longer exists as an
effective source of support and that an important part of the self has
disappeared.”226 Here, two forms of community are implicated in the
collective traumatization of Black Americans.
First, police violence targets the social ties of the Black community
itself, destroying families and disrupting the day-to-day social practices
Experimental Study, 392 Lancet 302, 302 (2018) (finding that police
killings of unarmed Black Americans adversely affect the mental health
of Black adults not directly involved in the killings).
224. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma, in Cultural
Trauma and Collective Identity 1, 1, 4 (2004) (quoting Kai T.
Erikson, Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in
the Buffalo Creek Flood 153–54 (1976)). For an overview of such a
sociological approach to collective traumatization, see Alexander, supra,
at 1–30. Central to the concept of collective trauma is the recognition that
traumatization can occur in victims who are not directly involved in the
triggering event. For example, Ron Eyerman, writing on American slavery
as a form of cultural trauma, argues that the repressive structures of
racism—and in particular, the memories of slavery these structures engendered—played a primary role in the creation of African American
identity, even amongst generations which lack firsthand experience with
these traumatizing structures. Ron Eyerman, Cultural Trauma:
Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity 14–15
(2003) (“Whether or not they directly experienced slavery or even had
ancestors who did, blacks in the United States were identified with and
came to identify themselves through the memory and representation of
slavery. This came about not as an isolated or internally controlled process,
but in relation and response to the dominant culture.”).
225. Downs, supra note 223; Tasha Williams, Research Shows Entire Black
Communities Suffer Trauma After Police Shootings, YES! Mag. (Aug. 3,
2018), https://www.yesmagazine.org/health-happiness/2018/08/03/researchshows-entire-black-communities-suffer-trauma-after-police-shootings
[https://perma.cc/5BJY-9HVP].
226. Erikson, supra note 224, at 154.
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of Black people everywhere. To be Black in America means to live in
constant fear of death at the hands of the state. Our decisions—from
the mundane to the monumental—are shaped by the possibility of this
fatal outcome. Whether deciding to go jogging or wear a hoodie or eat
a sandwich, the threat of police brutality seeps into every judgment,
every calculation, of the Black community. Black people choose to not
leave their home for work and to not have children out of fear of police
violence.227
Second, police brutality damages the social contract between Black
Americans and the State. As Monnica Williams, a clinical psychologist
and Director of the Center for Mental Health Disparities at the
University of Louisville, notes, within the Black community, police
killings have resulted in “a heightened sense of fear and anxiety when
you feel like you can’t trust the people who’ve been put in charge to
keep you safe.”228 Such state-sponsored violence effectively eliminates
the basis of social cooperation, leaving even the basic definition of the
broader American community—and thus Black individuals’ identities,
capabilities, and feelings of security—in need of critical reexamination.229 The collective traumatization plaguing the Black community
is characterized by what Monica Bell terms “legal estrangement,” that
is, the “process by which the law and its enforcers signal to marginalized
groups that they are not fully part of American society—that they are
not imbued with all the freedoms and entitlements that flow to other
Americans, such as dignity, safety, dreams, health, and political voice,
to name a few.”230 The current interactional and structural regimes that
maintain feelings of legal estrangement within the Black community
operate to effectively exclude that community from the broader
American collectivity, perpetuating a conception of blackness as social
and political death.
The Court’s individual rights framing of police violence against the
Black community results in an inability to legally account for the
collective dimensions of the trauma that results from excessive force.
The disruption of the very identities of Black Americans, the diminishment of their sense of security, and the deterioration of the ties that
bind Black people and the democratic state—these aspects of police
violence are ignored by the Court by virtue of the emphasis on
individual rights violations. Reframing equal protection as a collective
right to be free from gratuitous state violence, held by virtue of Black
227. Williams, supra note 225.
228. See Downs, supra note 223 (quoting Monnica Williams, clinical psychologist
and Director of the Center for Mental Health Disparities at the University
of Louisville).
229. Roberto Beneduce, Archeologie del Trauma: Un’Antropologia
del Sottosuolo 42 (2012).
230. Monica C. Bell, Legal Estrangement: A Concept for These Times, 48 Am.
Socio. Ass’n Footnotes (Special Issue) 7, 8 (2020).
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people’s membership in society, allows for a more holistic portrayal of
the rights violations that occur when police employ gratuitous force.
B. Broadening the Causes of Police Violence

A second diagnostic belief critical to a reframing of police brutality
is that such state violence is caused by a combination of factors,
including racial animus, implicit biases, and structural racism. The
notion that implicit bias plays a role in bringing about police brutality
is not new.231 While analysis of the potentiality of the Equal Protection
Clause remains limited, robust discussions exist with respect to implicitbias critiques of the discriminatory-intent requirement. Drawing on
social science, particularly that from cognitive and social psychology,
legal scholars have decried the Court’s discriminatory-intent requirement for its refusal to consider unconscious biases as a motivational
basis for police violence against Black people.232 In his seminal piece on
unconscious racism and equal protection, Charles Lawrence noted that
“unconscious racism . . . underlies much of the racially disproportionate
impact of governmental policy.”233 Implicit-bias research since then
makes clear that much of policing involves decision-making that takes
place largely at the sub-conscious level;234 thus, officers often lack the
requisite intent—that is, the conscious volition—to act in a way that
triggers liability.
Ultimately, courts’ disregard of the significant corpus of research
demonstrating the role of implicit bias as a catalyst for police violence
has resulted in the continued distortion of the causes of police violence,
thereby continuing the Fourth Amendment construction of officers as
isolated perpetrators. Under the existing equal-protection individual
rights frame, responsibility for the violation lies with the bad apples,

231. Implicit bias is defined as “the process of associating stereotypes or attitudes
towards categories of people without conscious awareness.” Kathleen Osta
& Hugh Vasquez, Don’t Talk About Implicit Bias Without Talking About
Structural Racism, Nati’l Equity Project (June 13, 2019), https://
medium.com/national-equity-project/implicit-bias-structural-racism-6c52
cf0f4a92 [https://perma.cc/J4T7-YY8C].
232. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1164 & n.11 (1995). For a discussion of implicit
bias, see generally Susan T. Fiske, What We Know Now About Bias and
Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century, 11 Current Directions
Psych. Sci. 123 (2002); Marianne Bertrand, Dolly Chugh, Sendhil
Mullainathan, Implicit Discrimination, 95 Am. Econ Rev. 94, 94–95
(2005).
233. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 355 (1987).
234. Carbado & Rock, supra note 160, at 161–62 & n.5.
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whose overt racial animus—rather than implicit bias—drives violations
of Black individuals’ right to equality under the law.235
Critiques of the courts’ failure to consider the role of implicit bias
are well founded but, ultimately, offer only a partial picture of the
causes of police brutality—one that still locates responsibility for police
violence in individual officers. The racism of officers—whether explicit
or implicit—is certainly important to consider in attempts to improve
officer training and minimize use-of-force incidents. However, the extant literature’s overemphasis on implicit bias results in a neglect of the
structural conditions, particularly those characterized by institutional
racism, that give rise to and maintain racial inequities and allow
implicit racial biases to flourish with impunity.
Reframing police violence as a violation of the collective right to
equal protection allows for a more holistic analysis of the causes of
police brutality: an analysis that captures the interactional and
structural nature of modern policing. At its core, a collective rights
frame places structural racism at the forefront of equal-protection
violation assessments. Structural racism is distinguished from traditional racism through the former’s seemingly invisible mode of operation. Whereas traditional racism is enacted out in the open, structural
racism operates behind the scenes, as a “complex, dynamic system of
conferring social benefits on some groups and imposing burdens on
others that results in segregation, poverty, and denial of opportunity
for millions of people of color.”236 Importantly, structural racism as a
predicate for police violence encompasses the “cultural beliefs” that
form the foundation for implicit biases, in addition to the “historical
legacies,” structural configurations, and “institutional policies” that
interact to create racially disparate life outcomes.237
Interestingly, in academic discussions of structural racism and equal
protection, scholars often neglect police brutality as a consequence of
structural racism, choosing to focus on phenomena that are seemingly
more protracted, such as residential segregation, voter disenfranchisement, and the school-to-prison pipeline. 238 This neglect is due, perhaps,
to the fact that police violence is often seen as a discrete event by
intentional actors, whereas racially disparate outcomes, such as residential segregation, appear to develop and take root over a longer period
of time. Nonetheless, a collective rights framing of both police violence
235. See supra Part I(A)(1).
236. Wiecek, supra note 178, at 4–5.
237. Id. at 5.
238. See, e.g., Chauncee D. Smith, Note, Deconstructing the Pipeline: Evaluating
School-to-Prison Pipeline Equal Protection Cases through a Structural
Racism Framework, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1009 (2009) (focusing on the
school-to-prison pipeline); Victoria J. Haneman, Contemplating Homeownership Tax Subsidies and Structural Racism, 54 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 363 (2019) (focusing on homeownership tax subsidies).
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and equal protection mandates redirecting attention away from individual motives to the structural mechanisms that enable and actively
promote police violence against Black people in America.
This reframing follows calls by Obasogie and Newman to remain
attentive to the roles played by policing policies in shaping the
dynamics of police brutality.239 A burgeoning corpus of Fourth Amendment legal scholarship has begun to identify the ways in which police
departments, their policies, and other structural features contribute to
the continued increase in police violence against the Black community.
Carbado and Rock, for example, propose a theoretical model that
characterizes racialized police violence as the product of interactions
between racialized structures in society.240 The implicated structures—
which increase Black people’s exposure to police officers, thereby increasing the probability of use of force against them—include proactive
policing, mass criminalization, racial segregation, racial stereotypes,
group vulnerability, police departments’ emphasis on revenue generation, and Fourth Amendment case law.241 Carbado and Rock’s model
demonstrates how implicit biases regarding the presumed criminal
inclinations of Black people, through institutional structures such as
proactive policing, become significant catalysts for racialized police violence.242 Without a structural environment conducive to implicit racial
stereotypes, their effect may diminish.243
239. Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous Fourth
Amendment: An Empirical Assessment of How Police Understandings of
Excessive Force Become Constitutional Law, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 1281,
1285–86 (2019).
240. Carbado & Rock, supra note 160, at 162–65.
241. Id. at 163–64. According to Carbado and Rock,
repeated police interactions create a risk of police violence
exposure. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the
simple fact of repeated police interactions overexposes African
Americans to the possibility of police violence. Second, the fact
that African Americans’ exposure to the police occurs against
the background of stereotypes of African Americans as violent
and dangerous increases the likelihood that police officers will
interact with African Americans from the perspective that violent
force is both necessary and appropriate. Third, the more exposed
African Americans are to the police, the greater the probability
that they will be arrested. This is important because an arrest
— being handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car —
increases the likelihood that an officer will use force.
Id. at 164.
242. Id. at 163–64.
243. Id. at 167 (“The flipside is that one’s underexposure to police diminishes
one’s vulnerability to police violence. If one is never stopped by the police,
the chance of being killed or physically abused by the police is virtually
nil.”).
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Among these structural catalysts for police violence are departmental use-of-force policies themselves. Applying “legal endogeneity
theory” to a content analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
use-of-force policies, Obasogie and Newman documented a pattern of
“federal courts abdicating their interpretive role and allowing the
administrative policies of police departments to define the meaning of
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.”244 This legal endogeneity occurs via an iterative process by which the Supreme Court’s
impoverished and vague case law with respect to police violence and
reasonable use of force give rise to departmental use of force policies
that symbolically reflect compliance with the ambiguous case law while
promoting departmental policy preference.245 This interaction results in
judicial deference to such symbolic compliance “with an external law
that was never clearly defined” in the first place.246 Rather than acting
as an external mechanism which police use-of-force policies conform to,
the Court’s Fourth Amendment framing of police brutality results in
the courts defining excessive force via reference to the meaning established in police department’s use-of-force documents.247 Courts have
invoked compliance with use-of-force policies as indicative of the reasonableness of the officer’s decision-making in excessive force cases.248 Some

244. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 239, at 1288–89 (crediting the creation
of legal endogeneity theory to Lauren B. Edelman, Working Law:
Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights 12 (2016)).
245. Id. at 1316–18, 1317 fig.3 (citing Edelman, supra note 244, at 12).
246. Id. at 1315 (citing Edelman, supra note 244, at 12).
247. Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Constitutional Interpretation
Without Judges: Police Violence, Excessive Force, and Remaking the
Fourth Amendment, 105 Va. L. Rev. 425, 427 (2019). Obasogie & Newman
note that judicial deference occurs when the courts treat compliance with
use-of-force policies as significant facts in evaluating the reasonableness of
an excessive force claim, going as far as to integrate such policies as central
pieces in court holdings. Obasogie & Newman, supra 239, at 1328–30. See
also Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force,
68 Fla. L. Rev. 1773, 1777 (2016) (“[T]he Court has diminished a
victim’s civil rights remedy through a substantive constitutional standard
under the Fourth Amendment that privileges the police perspective in
excessive force cases, affording latitude to the escalation of violence and
to police biases.” (emphasis added)).
248. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 239, at 1326–27 (discussing Parker v.
City of South Portland, No. 06–129–P–S, 2007 WL 1468658, at *13, *27–
29 (D. Me. May 18, 2007), adopted and affirmed by 2007 WL 2071815 (D.
Me. July 18, 2007), and finding that it was appropriate to grant summary
judgment for most of the involved officers in an excessive force case in
part because the officer complied “with his department’s use–of–force policy
and applicable law”).
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courts have gone as far as to rely on “internal adjudicatory process[es]
of . . . police department[s]” in reasonableness analyses.249
This line of research emphasizing the influential role of police
department policies in enacting—and justifying—police violence against
the Black community reflects a major deficit of the Fourth Amendment
and Equal Protection Clause’s individual rights frame. In addition to
individualizing the victims of police brutality, the Court’s framing
individualizes the perpetrators of what is both an agentic and deeply
structural act of violence. Reframing equal protection as a collective
right remedies the failures of both frames, shifting the locus of responsibility for racialized state violence from individual police officers to
police departments. As the following discussion demonstrates, this shift
is crucial if remedies for police violence are to have any lasting deterrent
effect.250
C. Reconceptualizing Equal Protection as Anti-Subordination

Recall that the prognostic beliefs of a given frame are inherently
linked to these frames’ diagnostic beliefs.251 That is, how the nature and
harm of police violence is constructed and understood intimately informs the range of remedies deemed legitimate and necessary to redress
this harm. Reframing equal protection as a collective, rather than individual, right forces a reconceptualization of what “equal protection”
means, moving understandings of equality away from anti-classification
and towards anti-subordination.
Such a reconceptualization is possible, in part, because of the
glaring absence of an “intelligible rule of decision” in the language of
the Equal Protection Clause itself.252 As Owen Fiss notes, the constitutional declaration that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” blesses the concept of
equality with constitutional status but provides no indication of what
the ideal of equality looks like or requires.253 This lack of legal clarity
249. See id. at 1326–27 (first citing Parker, 2007 WL 1468658, at *13; then
citing Scott v. Deleon, No. 15-cv-02193, 2016 WL 9685994, at *1 (W.D.
Ark. Nov. 8, 2016); then citing Remato v. City of Phoenix, No. CV 092027-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 3648268, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2011); and
then citing Gilbert v. Baldwin, No. 05-CV-1627-OWW-NEW (TAG),
2007 WL 4126084, at *5 (E.D. Ca. Nov. 20, 2007)).
250. Amar, supra note 162, at 812–13 (“The deterrence concept implicit in
both the text and history of the Amendment calls for placing (initial)
liability at the level best suited to restructure government conduct to
avoid future violations. For the Framers, that level was the constable; for
us, the police department.” (footnote omitted)).
251. Snow et al., supra note 17, at 470; see also supra Part I(A)(1).
252. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub.
Affs. 107, 108 (1976).
253. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1).
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has prompted the need for “mediating principle[s]”—paraphrases of the
Equal Protection Clause’s textual provisions that “‘stand between’ the
courts and the Constitution” and imbue such provisions with “meaning
and content.”254 In his seminal piece on groups and equal protection,
Fiss distinguishes between two competing mediating principles that the
courts and commentators rely on when defining equality and its requirements: the anti-discrimination (also known as anti–classification)
principle and the anti-subordination principle.255 Over time, the former
principle has triumphed over the latter, with courts and commentators
adopting anti-discrimination as the primary interpretive guideline for
making sense of the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.256
Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause’s individual rights framing of
police violence (which currently exists as the dominant framing of such
violence) reflects an anti-discrimination understanding of equality.
Under this hegemonic view, equality is reduced to formal or literal
equality, that is, the universal treatment of similarly situated individuals.257 This conception of equality is analogous to the liberal legalist
conception of “equal justice,” that is, the “norm prohibiting the adjudicator from taking into account certain irrelevant characteristics of the
litigants—their race, wealth, and so on.”258 Liberal legalism’s impersonal
view of judges, captured by Montesquieu’s declaration that “the
national judges are not more than the mouth that pronounces the words
of the law,” asserts that it is the law itself, in the absence of human
input, which generates decisions in the legal system.259 Such a colorblind
254. Id. at 107–08.
255. Id. at 108 (referring to the anti-subordination principle as “the groupdisadvantaging principle”); see also Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note
189, at 1063–64 (noting that debates over the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause “especially in the area of race jurisprudence, ha[ve] also
been historically represented as the difference between the principles of
antisubordination and anticlassification, or between the concepts of formal
and substantive equality.” (footnotes omitted)).
256. Fiss, supra note 252, at 108, 118 (“Antidiscrimination has been the
predominant interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
257. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 1063–64, 1064 n.17; Fiss, supra
note 252, at 108 (The antidiscrimination principle “reduce[s] the ideal of
equality to the principle of equal treatment—similar things should be
treated similarly.”); see also Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality:
Colorblindness, Frederick Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory,
56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 823, 831 (2008) (“Literal equality, without regard
to context or history, is the unifying principle of the Court’s race jurisprudence.”).
258. Fiss, supra note 252, at 119–20.
259. George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 269, 273–274, 274 n.18 (1984) (quoting 1 Montesquieu
(Charles de Secondat), The Spirit of the Laws 159 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900)).
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view of the law serves to legitimize the authority of the law and the
legal status quo by promoting uncritical acceptance of the legal canon,
working to silence alternative interpretations of the world in favor of
legalism’s “objective” legal reality.260
Under the individual rights frame, the Equal Protection Clause, as
mediated by the anti–discrimination principle, prohibits the government from breaking the veil of legal objectivity through differential
treatment on the basis of race. The state breaches its duty of equal
protection when it classifies individuals “either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category” such as race.261
The constitutional promise of equal protection of the laws under
the individual rights frame is “essentially a guarantee that the
categories delineated by legal rules will be ‘rational’ and will be rationally related to legitimate state ends.”262 All that the Equal Protection
Clause requires is rationality in legislation; any legislation that recognizes racial differences is inherently irrational and thus irrelevant to
any legitimate state purpose.263 This understanding of equal protection,
as adopted by the Court, has “created a framework for equal protection
analysis that all but ensures only a narrow group of discrimination
claims will be actionable or succeed.”264
This irrelevancy of racial differences is based on a historical view of
the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional response to the theory
of white supremacy and racial difference justifying slavery and the
Reconstruction-era’s black codes.265 Where slave laws and black codes
of the Southern states rested on the false theory of white supremacy,
the Fourteenth Amendment emerged as a federal repudiation of racial
distinctions in any form.266 The Equal Protection Clause, then, when
mediated by the anti-discrimination principle, is prohibitory in nature,
requiring nothing more than equal treatment of all groups under the
law. Such mediation may be seen in a variety of racial-justice issues
before the Court. For example, in Ricci v. DeStafano, 267 the Court held
that the race-based rejection of test results “is antithetical to the notion
of a workplace where individuals are guaranteed equal opportunity

260. Shklar, supra note 94, at 41.
261. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Mia. L. Rev. 9, 10 (2003).
262. Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1991).
263. Id. at 111–12.
264. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 1066.
265. West, supra note 262, at 112.
266. Id.
267. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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regardless of race.”268 Similarly, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,269 the Court declared that “[t]he
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”270
In contrast, under a collective rights framing of equal protection, in
which the mediating principle is that of anti-subordination, the meaning
of “equal protection of the law” is recontextualized and rehistoricized
as a critical provision in the broader Reconstruction Amendments.
Indeed, whereas anti-discrimination advocates willfully neglecting the
original purpose and legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a collective rights framing of the clause places such interpretive tools
at the forefront of the equality analysis.271 An anti–subordination view
of the Fourteenth Amendment is: “historically grounded not in the
pernicious idea of racial difference but, rather, in the pernicious practice
of racial subordination: the willful and continuing attempt of white
people, with the willing acquiescence of state governments, to subordinate, deny, oppress, and use black people for their own ends.”272
Indeed, the Reconstruction Amendments,273 of which the Fourteenth Amendment was a key part, were enacted due to the post-Civil
War fear that the newly freed Black citizens would experience
discrimination and rights violations by a hostile majority.274 Antisubordination advocates note that the subordination that prompted the
Fourteenth Amendment did not end with the Amendment’s passage.
Rather, the subordinating practices of whites merely adapted to the
times, with the continued oppression of the Black community found in
Jim Crow laws, the ghettoization of the North, and the hyper-carceral

268. Id. at 582, 584–85.
269. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
270. Id. at 748.
271. Shedding light on the meaning of equality is hard to do without placing
the challenges that modern society faces within the context of the particular
history that produced the Amendment. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra
note 189, at 1068–69.
272. West, supra note 262, at 112.
273. The “Reconstruction Amendments” refers to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments.
274. Jonathan Thompson, The Washington Constitution’s Prohibition on
Special Privileges and Immunities: Real Bite for “Equal Protection”
Review of Regulatory Legislation?, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1247, 1252 (1996);
see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1945) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (“Undoubtedly, however, the necessary protection of the new
freedman was the most powerful impulse behind the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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complex of the 20th and 21st centuries.275 This subordination is further
perpetuated through so-called facially neutral laws that preclude the
social, political, educational, and economic mobility of Black people.276
From an anti-subordination perspective of equality, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection cannot be realized in a society
characterized by “pervasive social stratification.”277 Rather, under a
collective rights framing of equal protection, Congress has a constitutional imperative to avail itself of the enforcement powers found in the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Black Americans
from state-sanctioned and private harm.278 Albeit intermittently, the
Court has at times recognized the affirmative nature and corrective
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Slaughter-House
Cases,279 the Court acknowledged that a central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was “the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newlymade freeman and citizen.”280 Similarly, in Strauder v. West Virginia,281
in which the Court found unconstitutional a state law declaring that
only white people may serve on juries, the Court noted that, while the
language of the Amendment is, in part, prohibitory, the text
contain[s] a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right,
most valuable to the colored race[]—the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored[]—
exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.282

The mandate, then, of the Equal Protection Clause, is not to ensure
the law is colorblind in its content and application, but to eradicate the
inequalities that comprise contemporary public and private life. In sum,
a collective rights framing of police violence as a violation of the Black
community’s right to equal protection of the law requires affirmative
275. For an overview of how the subordinating practices of the white majority
have evolved over time, see generally Michelle Alexander, The New
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
(10th Anniversary Ed. 2020).
276. West, supra note 262, at 112–13.
277. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 261, at 9–10.
278. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 1070; see U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 5 (granting Congress “the power to enforce . . . the provisions of
this article”).
279. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
280. Id. at 71.
281. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
282. Id. at 307–08.

831

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
We Can’t Breathe

steps to not only prevent further subordination of the Black community
through gratuitous state violence, but affirmative steps to minimize the
inequalities stemming from such subordination as well.
D. Performative Analysis: The Enactment of Dissident Citizenship

Understanding police violence against the Black community as a
violation of this community’s collective right to equal protection of the
law brings with it certain performative effects. Leaving the instrumental
value of such a rights frame aside, what are victims of police violence
doing in and by claiming a collective right to be free from gratuitous,
racialized state violence? A performative approach to such rights claims
highlights the ways in which such rights claims made by those on the
margins of society are not only the part of the process of securing rights,
but as a performance of citizenship as well—one that begins to challenge
the hegemonic constructions of the rights-bearing American citizen as
white.
It is precisely because citizenship is unstable, contestable, and
constitutive of rights that citizenship is performed—and potentially
transformed—in and through the process of making rights claims.
Citizenship marks a status within society that is dependent on not only
the nature of rights, but also on who is included in the rights-bearing
regime in the first place. As such, “[p]erformative citizenship signifies
both a struggle (making rights claims) and what that struggle
performatively brings into being (the right to claim rights).”283 It is
through the process of making rights claims that citizenship is not only
enacted but possibly transformed as well.
Because “a performative perspective considers citizenship as
anything but stable,”284 the subject positions of Black Americans
making rights claims to the characteristics of citizenship are thus made
open to a change in status, from the “subaltern” to a “more liveable
position[].”285 By making status-based rights claims, Black victims of
police violence can engage in the generative process of creating new
forms of political subjectivity, a process “whereby people who have no
place or voice in a political community act as if they have both and, in
doing so, shift the basic understandings and boundaries of that community.”286 In doing so, Black victims of state violence work to enact a
kind of dissident citizenship that is fundamentally democratic in nature.
First conceptualized by Holloway Sparks, “dissident citizenship”
can be understood as “the practices of marginalized citizens who
publicly contest prevailing arrangements of power by means of oppositional democratic practices that augment or replace institutionalized
283. Isin, supra note 152, at 506.
284. Id. at 502.
285. Id. at 503.
286. Zivi, supra note 65, at 92.
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channels of democratic opposition when those channels are inadequate
or unavailable.”287 Eschewing institutionalized practices of resistance,
such as voting and petitioning, dissident citizens engage in creative
oppositional practices in the public sphere such as marches, sit-ins, and
street theater—practices that have the potential to “reconstitute the
very boundaries of the political itself.”288
Sparks’s conception of dissident citizenship differs from traditional
notions of citizenship found in the liberal and civic-republican
traditions, as well as the more provocative views of citizenship found in
participatory and deliberative democracy literature, in that dissident
citizens do not contest current arrangements of power as participatory
equals. Rather dissident citizens act “from the margins of their nondemocratic polities because they have no institutionalized channels of
opposition available or because they lack meaningful access to those
channels.”289 While Sparks focuses primarily on dissident acts of citizenship that occur outside of institutionalized forms of contestation,
namely, in the public sphere, she maintains room for dissident citizens
to engage in institutionalized dissent as well.290
Merry’s exploration of legal consciousness among working-class
plaintiffs reflects this kind of enactment of dissident citizenship in
institutionalized channels of democratic contestation.291 Merry notes
that although working-class plaintiffs in America
have submitted their problems voluntarily for the court’s consideration, suggesting a willingness to accept its authority. . . . [T]he
choice of court is not unconstrained: virtually the only alternatives are violence and enduring the situation. Local authorities
are absent or ignored. These people are resisting in the sense that
they are trying to control the course of their problem in court. . . .
Here, resistance consists of challenges to the court’s efforts to
determine which discourse frames the problem at hand. Plaintiffs
resist this cultural domination by asserting their own understanding of the problem, usually by insisting on talking about it
in legal discourse.292

287. Holloway Sparks, Dissident Citizenship: Democratic Theory, Political
Courage, and Activist Women, 12 Hypatia, no. 4, 1997, at 75.
288. Id. at 75.
289. Id. at 84.
290. Id.
291. See generally Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting
Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working-Class Americans
134–49 (1990) (discussing plaintiff’s narratives).
292. Id. at 147.
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Thus, the enactment of dissident citizenship can take place even within
institutionalized channels associated with the state, provided that such
challenges come from, not participatory equals, but those existing on
the margins of a community. By making a claim to the collective right
to equality within the context of the broader constitutional terrain that
forecloses such claims, Black victims can enact a form of dissident
citizenship that undermines dominant conceptions of rights-bearing
citizenship in the United States that are premised on the exclusion of
Black people.

Conclusion: The Return of Injunctive Relief?
The performative value of reframing excessive force as a violation
of Black people’s collective right to equality before the law is distinct
from its instrumental value in the courtroom. As Zivi rightfully
observes, by
treat[ing] rights claims as performative utterances rather than as
representations of legal fact or moral truth, as claims of persuasion that represent perspectives that may or may not influence
the behavior and thought of others rather than as trumping
claims that will, if uttered under the proper circumstances, guarantee some particular outcome, a great deal more becomes
visible.293

For Black victims of police violence, such rights claiming can be seen
as an expression of the community’s democratic commitment to
substantive, rather than formal, equality, as well as an enactment of
dissident citizenship, in which Black people demand accountability
from a reluctant state to acknowledge and redress racialized state
violence.
While a performative approach to the framing of police violence
through various constitutional amendments brings to the forefront the
nature of such violence and its impact, victims, and perpetrators, such
analysis has instrumental value as well. Indeed, by reframing equal
protection as a collective right to be free from gratuitous state violence,
a broader view of the harms of police violence emerges that may be
useful to plaintiffs facing an uphill battle in securing equitable relief.
Since Los Angeles v. Lyons,294 the Court, using a Fourth Amendment frame, has interpreted the standing requirements for victims of
police brutality strictly, refusing to make injunctive relief available to
plaintiffs in the absence of credible assertions that (1) all police officers
in a given department always use excessive force against “any citizen
with whom they happen to encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest,
293. Zivi, supra note 65, at 70–71.
294. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

834

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
We Can’t Breathe

issuing a citation, or for questioning”; or (2) a municipality orders or
authorizes officers to use excessive force.295 This sets an almost
impossible threshold for obtaining injunctive relief, meaning that
plaintiffs are essentially prevented from enjoining police violence at the
institutional level, where deterrent effects are at its greatest.
To be Black in America means to live in constant fear of death at
the hands of the state. Yet, the Constitution does not protect my right,
as a Black person, to go for a run in my own neighborhood without
having to consider the state-sponsored threats waiting for me outside.
Indeed, the Constitution imposes no affirmative duty on law enforcement to prevent the fear of being murdered by the police.296 Since
federal “judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a
constitutional violation,”297 for Article III standing purposes, such a
psychological injury does not constitute the requisite personal stake
necessary to establish a case or controversy.298
However, when we take a broader view of the harms imposed by
police violence, as the collective rights frame does, the rights implicated
by discriminatory state violence and, by extension, the necessity of
equitable relief, becomes clear. To be free from discriminatory state
violence means to be free to exercise, to the fullest extent possible, one’s
constitutional right to movement (Trayvon Martin,299 Casey

295. Id. at 105–06.
296. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–77 (1976) (holding that city
officials had no “constitutional ‘duty’” to “‘eliminate’ future police misconduct,” even “in the face of a statistical pattern” of police abuse); O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496–97 (1974) (holding that a “perceived
threat” of future “discriminatory practices” by state officials is unactionable “speculation and conjecture,” even in the face of “past wrongs”); Laird
v. Tatum 408 US 1, 13–14 (1972) (holding that “subjective” “apprehensiveness,” “perception[s],” or “beliefs” of future injury will not, alone,
confer standing).
297. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
298. See, e.g., Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372–73 (holding that plaintiffs “lacked the
requisite ‘personal stake in the outcome’” because their fears of police
conduct were based on “what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future”).
299. N.Y. Times Ed. Bd., Trayvon Martin’s Legacy, N.Y. Times (July 14,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/opinion/trayvon-martinslegacy.html [https://perma.cc/RF3M-KCZK] (“Trayvon Martin was an
unarmed boy walking home from the convenience store.”).
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Goodson,300 Clayton Dobbins301), to bear arms (Philando Castile302), to
receive due process (Sandra Bland303), to associate (Breonna Taylor304),
to be left alone at home (Shase Howse305) and to enjoy one’s life and
liberty (Tamir Rice,306 and countless others). The injury of relevance
here is not “the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions”307 but how these
subjective apprehensions impinge on the entry rights of Black individuals in America. Thus, a collective equal rights framing of the right
to be free from gratuitous state violence provides a pathway by which
victims of police violence may plead around the standing requirements
set forth in Lyons.
Unlike in Rizzo v. Goode, the “constitutional ‘duty’” posited, under
a collective rights frame, on behalf of the state (and a corresponding
“right” of Black people in America) is not “to ‘eliminate’ future police
300. John Ismay & Christine Hauser, Casey Goodson Died from Multiple Gunshot
Wounds, Coroner Says, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/12/09/us/casey-goodson-ohio-homicide.html [https://perma.cc/
MS7F-GFXU] (“Mr. Goodson was returning home with sandwiches after
a dentist’s appointment . . . .”).
301. Andrea Januta, Andrew Chung, Jaimi Dowdell & Lawrence Hurley,
Challenging Police Violence . . . While Black, Reuters (Dec. 23, 2020,
7:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-police-immunity-racespecialrepor-idUKKBN28X1H2 [https://perma.cc/LHD9-SDUR] (“Clayton
Dobbins . . . [was] riding his bike in his own neighborhood.”).
302. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. Times (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/
police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/XWH4-JGRP]
(noting that Castile “had acknowledged having [a gun] with him when he
was pulled over” and that a witness said that Castile “had merely been
reaching for his identification” when he was shot).
303. Mitch Smith, Grand Jury Declines to Indict Anyone in Death of Sandra
Bland, N.Y. Times (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
22/us/grand-jury-finds-no-felony-committed-by-jailers-in-death-of-sandrabland.html [https://perma.cc/77CW-MBTG] (noting that Bland’s apparent
suicide “was met with suspicion by family members and activists” and
that no one was ever indicted for her death).
304. Rukmini Callimachi, Breonna Taylor’s Life was Changing. Then the
Police Came to Her Door, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
08/30/us/breonna-taylor-police-killing.html [https://perma.cc/G838-EXJZ]
(last visited Oct. 28, 2021) (noting that Taylor was staying with her boyfriend at her sister’s apartment and that police were actually looking for
her ex-boyfriend).
305. Januta et al., supra note 301 (“Shase Howse . . . [was] fumbling for his
keys while standing on his front porch in Cleveland.”).
306. Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face
Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiingcleveland.html [https://perma.cc/43DB-7ZE2] (noting that Rice was “a
12-year-old boy holding a pellet gun” in a park).
307. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S 95, 107 n.8 (1983).
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misconduct.”308 Rather, the duty in its narrowest sense is to prevent
gratuitous, racialized state violence. More broadly, this duty (and the
corresponding right) of law enforcement is one of ensuring equal opportunity for the Black community to exercise those entry rights that exist
by virtue of our membership in American society. When the state,
through law enforcement, breaches this affirmative duty—whether due
to the adoption of proactive policing policies, the de facto policies of
police departments, or the discriminatory intent of individual officers—
courts must be empowered to order prospective equitable relief in order
to ensure these entry rights.
Alexandra L. Raleigh†

308. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (“Respondents posit a constitutional
‘duty’ on the part of petitioners (and a corresponding ‘right’ of the citizens
of Philadelphia) to ‘eliminate’ future police misconduct; a ‘default’ of that
affirmative duty being shown by the statistical pattern, the District Court
is empowered to act in petitioners’ stead and take whatever preventive
measures are necessary . . . to secure the ‘right’ at issue. . . . We have
never subscribed to these amorphous propositions, and we decline to do
so now.”). While the Supreme Court is misguided in its denial of the nonrecurrence of violence as a fundamental—if not, constitutional—right, a
discussion of the right to non-recurrence of state-sponsored violence is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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